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After 2008, China's economic potential became significantly more visible and also 
attracted the attention of the European Union (EU). In particular, some EU members expressed 
strong interest in China's investments and begin to develop incentives to link political and 
economic relations to gain benefits from Outward Direct Investment (OFDI).  
 The fundamental question explored in this study is: How has Chinese Outward Foreign 
Direct Investment in the EU during the Global Financial Crisis affected the EU member states’ 
socio-political attitude towards China? The question is principally concerned whether there is a 
correlation between Chinese OFDI in the EU and individual EU Member State’s policy changes 
to attract and potentially increase their share of Chinese OFDI. Furthermore, I want to investigate 
whether those processes ameliorate public opinions of China.   
 I propose that there is a correlation between Chinese OFDI in the EU and public opinion 
towards China as well as EU’s policy changes that are meant to increase the inflow of Chinese 
OFDI. Based on this assertion, I adopt data on public opinion and qualitative data on 
governmental attitude. The findings are further applied to case-studies in Spain, Romania, 
Hungary and Serbia. 
 This study argues that because of the financial crisis of 2008, the EU became more 
vulnerable to investments. China's economic potential became highly sought after, and certain EU 
members started to develop incentives to link political and economic relations with China together 
to secure further investments. Opinion polls show that the overall percentage of people who view 
China as rather favorable has experienced a steady growth since 2008, and is accompanied by a 
high inflow of Chinese investments. The second part of the findings shows that certain EU 
countries have a tendency to offer compromises that favor China in order to receive economic 
financial support. This makes Chinese investments political with the potential for political 
influence and can also lead to a relation of dependency.  This trend has led scholars believe that it 
is the political factors that influence and shape economic factors. With China's appearance on the 




CHAPTER I. Introduction 
 
Until recently, Chinese companies conducting OFDI have followed a trend of investing 
mainly in developing countries for the purpose of obtaining natural resources. However, 2002 
represented the start of a new era: China began to integrate itself into the world economy and a 
massive emergence of Chinese companies occurred in the EU. Phenomenally, the outflow of 
Chinese OFDI hasn’t slowed down, even during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (Filippov, 
Kalotaym, 2009). While China's preference before the crisis was developing economies, during 
the crisis China developed a particular interest for advanced markets.  Unusually, those markets, 
in the later stage of the crisis, experienced a boom of Chinese OFDI. From 2006 to 2009, OFDI 
inflows into the EU tripled. Furthermore, it tripled again by 2011 to $10 billion. The overall 
number of contracts with a value of about $1 million doubled from 50 to nearly 100 in 2010 and 
2011. By 2010 China was already the 5
th
 biggest outward investor after the United States, 
Germany, France, and Hong Kong (Hanemann and Rosen, 2012; Ebbers, Zhang, 2010). 
 Nevertheless, the arrival of the Chinese companies’ investments caused several concerns 
at the EU side, as these newcomers were still strangers to the EU market, and the impact of their 
investments was unclear. Concerns were raised over China’s Investment Corporation (CIC) 
established in 2007. With almost $200 billion of assets under management, it is one of the 
biggest Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) worldwide (Hanemann, Rosen, 2012; Ebbers, Zhang, 
2010). Further attention was drawn when CIC assets reached $410 billion by the beginning of 
2011. Acquisitions of big names such as Volvo, the port of the Piraeus, Ferreti Luxury yachts 
and Hungary’s leading PVC manufacturer BorsodChem has led to divided views: one group of 
scholars see Chinese OFDI as a typical choice of strategy of an emerging economy that expands 
to international markets, on the other hand there are some who suspect a certain political strategy 
rooting in the exponential growth of Chinese investments in the EU (Meunier, 2012; Xu, et al., 
2012). There is little clarity and consensus regarding the nature of Chinese investment strategies. 
This is because the Chinese government has been actively involved in the investment procedures, 
which makes these investments political. 
  
In this study, I ask the question: How has Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment in 
the EU during the Global Financial Crisis affected EU member states’ socio-political attitude 
2 
 
towards China? I intend to examine if there exists a correlation between Chinese OFDI and the 
EU's attitude towards China. Moreover, I am interested in the character of EU's attitude towards 
China and how favorable it is, and additionally, its effects on EU's willingness to compromise on 
its own values, norms and principles. 
 I suggest that there is a potential that Chinese OFDI in the EU contributes to the shaping 
of social and political outcomes. Based on this assertion I adopt data on public opinion and 
qualitative data on governmental attitude. The findings are further applied to case-studies in 
Spain, Romania, Hungary, and Serbia. 
 The main argument of this study is that because of the financial crisis of 2008 and EU's 
desperate quest for capital and investments, the EU has turned into a vulnerable actor with a high 
sensitivity towards investments.  
 Since 2008 and the outbreak of the global economic crisis, China's economic potential 
became significantly more visible and also attracted the attention of the European Union.
 Furthermore certain EU members have started to develop incentives to link political and 
economic relations together to secure further investments. Opinion polls show that the overall 
percentage of people who view China as rather favorable experienced a steady growth since 
2008 and is accompanied by a high inflow of Chinese investments. Furthermore, certain EU 
countries tend to offer political compromises to China in order to receive economic financial 
support. This makes Chinese investments political with the potential of political influence and 
could lead to a relation of dependency. While the trend has led scholars believe that it is the 
political factors that influence and shape economic factors, with China's appearance on the EU 
market, the view has to be extended by analyzing socio-political effects of Chinese OFDI in the 
EU.  
 In this study I am intrigued by the decisions made by government decision makers in 
various EU countries and changes in EU public opinion that I treat as a result of the influence 
and processes of Chinese OFDI in the EU.  Instead of looking at Chinese OFDI as a variable that 
is dependent on political strategies or choices, I investigate cases through which I intend to build 
a correlation between Chinese OFDI and EU's socio-political attitude. “The ability to look at 
sub-units that are situated within a larger case is powerful when you consider that data can be 
analyzed within the subunits separately (within case analysis), between the different subunits 
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(between case analysis), or across all of the subunits (cross-case analysis)”  (Baxter and Jack, 
2008).  Within this study, I use mainly qualitative data. 
 
 
CHAPTER II. Literature Review 
 2.1. Chinese Investments and their Strategies 
 
In the literature on Chinese OFDI, there have been so far three main approaches for the 
conceptualization of the motivations and rationales of Chinese direct investment in the European 
Union. However, those approaches capture only a domain that discusses the origins of strategies 
of Chinese OFDI. Traditionally, the research done on Chinese OFDI argues that in terms of 
advanced economies, Chinese firms are pushed mainly by the hunt for strategic resources 
(Nicolas, Thomsen, 2008; Deng, 2007; Buckley and Ghauri, 1999; Caves, 1971). For Chinese 
companies, this competitive advantage was relatively crucial when investing into simple and 
lower income developing markets in Africa and Asia (UNCTAD, 2004; Zafar, 2007; Sanfillipo, 
2010; Deng, 2009; Dunning, 1993; Coxhead, 2007; Kolstad, Wiig, 2012; Dunning, 1977 and 
1988).  
Traditional industrial organizational thinking emphasizes that a company’s strategies are 
dependent on the conditions within the industry it operates in (Porter, 1990). A firm will pursue 
international expansion and search for new lucrative opportunities when the level of competition 
within an industry is high (Yang, et al., 2009). Cheng and Stough (2007), Wu (2005) and Zhang 
and Filippov (2009) define overcapacity and falling prices as some of the main motives for 
Chinese OFDI.  
Through targeting advanced economies, companies are able to build international brands 
and R&D centers, as well as gain access to advanced technologies (Filippov, Saebi, 2008). 
Consequently, the initial competitive advantage of labor costs becomes less important. Building 
on institutional theory, scholars propose a model based on a home country’s factors. Recent 
scholars find agreement on Chinese firms being highly affected by interplays of institutional 
forces (Peng, 2002; Buckley et al., 2007; Deng, 2009; Gattai, 2010; Luo et al., 2010).  
Yet, those conceptions evaluate the rationale of the company's strategy rather than its 
effects on a market.  
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 2.2. Roots of China’s Hunger for Investments 
 
Recent scholarship takes an additional step by investigating the motivation and drive 
behind Chinese firms. This literature offers us an insight into a fragmented discussion that keeps 
changing according to the newest developments in the political and economic scene.  
The economic crisis depressed asset prices worldwide, and Chinese OFDI began to 
challenge international investment norms by commencing multibillion dollar tenders for firms 
facing financial difficulties or bankruptcy. The Chinese government started to promote OFDI by 
introducing positive forces and easing regulatory procedures and Chinese investments began to 
shift towards commercially crucial levels. Whereas natural resource oriented firms are of state-
owned nature, profit driven entities are mainly privately held or non-state publicly held firms 
(Ramasamy, Yeung, Laforet, 2012; Cui, Jiang, 2009a, 2009b). In this case, the EU receives most 
of the academic attention. While between 2004 and 2008, annual OFDI flows didn’t reach the 
value of $1 billion OFDI in 2009 and 2010 tripled to almost $3 billion yearly after which they 
tripled again to almost $10 billion in 2011, “Precisely when the euro-zone crisis was at what 
most hope was the apex of the region's financial uncertainty and potential economic risk” 
(Shobert, 2012). 359 of 573 (two third) of deals are pursued by private firms but the picture 
changes when looking at the total value of deal: 72% of the total $21 billion comes from State 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) (Ramasamy, et al.; Cui, Jiang, 2009a, 2009b). This I consider to be 
one of the recent disagreements in the field of Chinese OFDI in the EU: the question of whether 
Chinese investments in the EU are either politically driven or pushed by the Chinese 
government, or simply profit-driven. Authors introduce new players such as the Sovereign 
Wealth Fund China Investment Corporation (CIC) established in 2007 that was equipped with 
initial financial resources of $200 billion (Berger and Berkofsky, 2007). By the beginning of 
2011, CIC assets had grown to $410 billion, “with accelerated investments into higher-risk assets 
such as private equity and hedge fund”. 1  As a result the role of the government and its 
institutions are being incorporated more frequently (Meunier, 2012).  
However, studies lack a valid explanation on why discussions about possible strategies 
and roots of Chinese investments are important. Without defining the normative value of Chinese 
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OFDI in the EU or its positive or negative consequences, it is rather difficult to conclude what 
contribution the former disputes might represent.  
Those views, while seeking to define the roots of China's recent greed for new markets, 
also trigger new questions regarding a possible political impact, which not only some scholars 
but also media, with headlines such as “China buys Europe” (Meunier, 2012; Groves, 2011), use 
to argue that China is using OFDI as a strategy to exchange short-term political signals or to 
enforce foreign policy goals (Hanemann, 2012; Rosen, Hanemann, 2009; Meunier, 2012). This 
also opens up the discussion about potential national security fears related to China’s sudden 
presence in the EU market (Hanemann, 2012; Rosen, Hanemann, 2009). Nonetheless, the 
literature published mainly after 2010 adds new insights into the field. It shows a tendency to 
discuss the actual impact of Chinese OFDI on political variables. 
 
 
 2.3. Chinese OFDI in Europe: an Independent Variable without Precedents 
 
There is literature on the impact of OFDI on host country’s institutions and practices such 
as human rights (Meyer 1996), corruption (Larrain and Tavares 2004), child labor (Neumayer 
and de Soysa 2005), environmental practices (Prakash and Potoski 2007), and local government 
budgets (Figlio and Blonigen 2000). OFDI, Spar (1999) argues, “tends naturally to improve the 
conditions of human rights in developing countries, either as a direct result of a [corporation’s] 
activity or as an indirect result of improved conditions created by those investments."  However, 
existing theories lack three dimensions. The first dimension, defined by Meunier (2012) concerns 
the fact that Chinese OFDI also confronts EU with novel challenges without historical precedent: 
Firstly, it is unusual for a developing country such as China to invest into a developed economy, 
EU. Also, it has to be understood that China preserves a communist regime. As such it invests 
into a democratic open market community. Thirdly, EU and China are security rivals. Therefore, 
Chinese investments are being invested in non-allied countries. 
This viewpoint was expressed by these voices only recently. Ahlquist, and Prakash 
(2009) as well as Ebber and Zhang (2010) belong to the category of scholars treating OFDI as a 
factor that has incentives to influence domestic institutions. To a certain extent, they evaluate the 
shift of the barriers in the European institutional framework in relation towards China (Ebber and 
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Zhang, 2010). Additionally, it is not only the institutional or market barriers that shift. China as a 
country attracts much interest in EU: “developments in China top European agendas and fill 
newspaper pages; governments, businessmen and scholars are discussing the challenges and 
opportunities that their countries face vis-à-vis a rising China”; there are rising “opinions about 
China, in particular political matters, perceptions are negative; but at the same time Europe 
seems intrigued by, and attracted to, China” (d’Hooghe, 2010). 
This implies that there could be a certain degree of influence of Chinese OFDI on the 
socio-political domain. “The ability to get what you want through attraction rather than through 
coercion” (Nye, 2004; p.2) is the definition of the concept of soft power by Nye (2004). It 
includes keywords such as “attraction” and “influence”.  
According to his definition, soft power “could be developed through relations with allies, 
economic assistance, and cultural exchange" (Nye, 2004; p.2) which leads to “a more favorable 
public opinion and credibility abroad” (Nye, 2004; p.2). In his concept, he uses mostly the 
context of a country’s culture or ideology which others may be willing to follow. Authors who 
use his concept of soft power mainly focus on manifestations such as government policies, 
personal contacts and cultural export (Ernest, 2008; Joffe, 2006; Kurlantzick, 2007; Wang, 
2008).  
However, it is often overlooked that his definition does mention “economic assistance” as 
a possible exchange rate of soft power. Adding to Meunier (2012) who highlights that China 
cannot be treated equally as its co-actors such as the United States, Chinese OFDI could 
eventually represent a new tool which contributes to the rise of China’s soft power in the EU. 
Subsequently, when applying the concept of soft power to the case of China's OFDI in the EU, 
soft power does not necessarily equal cultural power.  
Yet, economic strength is not necessarily considered to be soft. The reason for that can be 
found in the misinterpretation of what “economic power” means in the first place. It is being 
reduced to economic sanctions and other tools which are intended to coerce. However, as Nye in 
one of his articles argues, “Economic strength can be converted into hard or soft power: You can 
coerce countries with sanctions or woo them with wealth” (Nye S., 2006). Current literature on 
China’s growing use of soft power is directed to regions such as Southeast Asia (Lum, Morrison 
and Vaughn, 2008; Kurlantzick, 2007) or it is considered as a result of the decline of American 
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soft power (Kurlantzick). Also, the concept tends to be simply reduced to describe its impact on 
external policies (Wang and Lu, 2008). 
 
 
CHAPTER III. Research Question 
 
My research question for this project is “how does Chinese Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment in the EU during the Global Financial Crisis affect the EU's socio-political attitude 
towards China?  
The question is principally concerned with Chinese OFDI in the EU and how it influences 
further economic processes and socio-political factors in the EU. Furthermore, I want to 
investigate whether those processes and attitude towards China are favorable and whether they 
have an effect on the country's norms or on its openness to compromise on its own values and 
principles. These components might provoke associations between the research question and 
China's usage of soft power. Yet, the intention differs. When talking about soft power, it is 
understood that it is the country that intentionally builds, uses and shapes its soft power. While I 
am not implying that China does not use any soft power tools, I do imply that the outcomes of 
Chinese OFDI in the EU contribute to China's soft power politics. However, this argument does 
not aim to present Chinese OFDI as a part of China's soft power strategy, but rather as a factor 
that contributes and actively affects China's soft power, as well as showing it has the potential to 
be adopted by the government itself and to be developed into China's soft power strategy.  
The definition of OFDI used throughout this paper is based on the definition provided by 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): "Outward direct 
investment is investment by a resident direct investor in a non-resident direct investment 
enterprise; the direction of the influence by the direct investor is “outward” for the reporting 
economy; also referred to as direct investment abroad”2. References to OFDI are measured on a 
yearly basis unless otherwise specified. 
The term "socio-political" has never been easily defined until very recently. It can be 
linked to the subject of political sociology. In general, it has been identified in terms of the 
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relations between state and society. However, to take a new approach to the term, I am not 
looking at the relation between the units "socio" and "political", but at the relation between 
China's OFDI and the EU society and its member states. As mentioned above, Chinese OFDI in 
the context of its influence could be easily linked to the term “soft power”. It is “the ability to get 
what you want through attraction rather than through coercion” and it “could be developed 
through relations with allies, economic assistance, and cultural exchanges”; which leads to “a 
more favorable public opinion and credibility abroad”. Yet, "soft power" is a tool used 
strategically by a country. While in this study I argue that Chinese investments may contribute to 
the rise of China's soft power, the argument does not support the conscious and tactical intention 
of China's usage of its OFDI as its tool. However, once the soft power potential of Chinese OFDI 
will be discovered, China may start to apply it intentionally.  As a result, China has or will have 
the ability to shape the agenda in international or bilateral relations, based on its own principles 
and ideas (Nye, 2004).  
This paper sees the global financial crisis as the trigger of the current state of affairs. The 
financial crisis of 2008 selected and excluded potential foreign buyers and investors in the EU, as 
well as put the EU into a deprived position while Chinese firms took this momentum as an 
opportunity to move upwards and enter the EU market. In an article on EU-China investment 
relations, presented at an EIUSS expert meeting in October 2012, Jonas Parello-Plesner 
identified some Chinese OFDI as a direct outcome of the crisis in the Eurozone. He believes 
that the crisis gave an “extra impetus to Chinese investments in the EU” (Casarini, 2009 and 
2013). I observe the period from the start of the crisis through October 2008 when market 
conditions deteriorated precipitously and rapidly. 
The significant increase of Chinese OFDI symbolizes the beginning of an era in which 
China is becoming an active member of the world economy. While other members have 
decreased their investments during the financial crisis of 2009 China did not stop but tripled its 
outflows to the EU from 2006 to 2009 and tripled again by 2011. This phenomenon raised 
certain concerns about the nature, drivers, and motives of Chinese investments. Those concerns 
are a result of China’s appearance as a sudden, unknown and therefore unpredictable player. 
However, recent literature on Chinese OFDI has a tendency to focus mainly on China’s 
investments and its investment firms in the EU. The character of the literature is rather of a 
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descriptive nature and underestimates the level of normative elements as well as the effects and 
implications of Chinese investments on the host country level tend to be undervalued.  
The Chinese economy went through several changes only recently and the topic is new 
and underrepresented. It was mainly the media who captured certain events about China’s 
presence in the EU. They started to play an influential role in setting an anxious tone of public 
debate surrounding Chinese OFDI. This resulted in a change of the character of Chinese OFDI: it 
no longer represented simply an emerging economic trend, but became a polarizing political 
issue for recipient countries as well as the public. Headlines such as “Silence on human 
rights...the price Europe must pay for China's billions” (Groves, 2011), “Europe 'will ease 
pressure on China over human rights in exchange for bailout'” (Branigan, 2011), or “Is Europe 
selling its human rights?” (Groves, 2011) are headlines that portray the current perception 
towards Chinese investment echoes in the public. “The media thus plays an influential role in 
setting a new context of public debate surrounding Chinese investments in the EU” (Cai, 2012). 
Although there is a minor number of scholars who investigate the relationship between foreign 
direct investments and host countries´ contracting institutions (Ahlquist, Prakash, 2010) there is a 
significant lack of literature that would not only examine this particular debate in relation to the 
current presence of Chinese investments in the EU but also clarify and give public and media 
tensions a scholastic character including validity and reliability.  
My project would therefore contribute firstly to the definition of “soft power” itself. Soft 
power has been treated as a form of cultural power and the so far undervalued economic side of 
soft power has gained a new relevance precisely after the outbreak of the global financial crisis 
of 2008. China as a communist and developing country, with an economy that rivals U.S, is a 
case without a precedent and therefore approaching this phenomenon in the same way as it tends 
to be done in the majority of the literature would be misleading. When talking about soft power, 
economic features should not be excluded, since they do not necessarily involve coercive 
implications.  
Additionally, OFDI has gained a status of an independent variable that carries political 
implications for a host country, which represents a rather unusual approach in academia. I 
therefore add a new value to the relation between economic and political variables. 
 However, the public as well as the global political economy does show a certain degree 
of fear and doubt regarding the sudden flows of Chinese OFDI. The concern is that the EU will 
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become dependent on Chinese investment, which could provide China with political and security 
leverage and have a potential impact on EU values such as human rights. The prospective 
relationship between foreign direct investment and human rights has been a prominent issue 
within the global political economy, but the linkage is empirically underdeveloped. On one hand, 
Chinese acquisitions triggered excitement about the potential to improve the economy and save 
bankrupt companies as well as securing employments and contributing to smaller economies. On 
the other hand, it also triggered concerns regarding national security (Meunier, 2012). Giving a 
clearer picture of the actual implications of Chinese OFDI on the EU market would therefore 
resolve several complicated dilemmas for EU policymakers.  
 
 
CHAPTER IV. Theory and Conceptualization  
 
           In this paper I shall argue that the financial crisis made the EU more vulnerable to 
Chinese investments, and as a consequence, it created space for an increased induction of 
China’s influence over the socio-political attitude of the EU. Chinese OFDI in the EU is, 
according to my argument, the main contributor to the rise of China’s soft power in the EU. 
           The previous literature, as stated above, state that it is the institutions or host countries 
that shape the dimensions of OFDI (Jensen 2003; Li and Resnick 2003). However my argument 
describes OFDI as a factor that has the incentive to influence domestic institutions and acts as a 
distributor of China’s soft power in the EU. Therefore, in contrast to the work done in academia, 
in my paper, Chinese OFDI gains the status of an independent variable while the outcome of the 
EU's attitude represents the dependent variable. As a result, I claim that Chinese OFDI in the EU 
can be responsible for shaping political outcomes. My argument posits that economic resources, 
in my case Chinese OFDI, has the potential to contribute to soft-power attitude, since a 
successful economic model can eventually attract other states to imitate its example, or during 
times when a state is in a financial need, the public could start considering a stronger economy 
that can provide economic support as a favorable option despite possible opposing or 





4.1. Soft Power, Economic Power and the Power of Attraction 
 
Soft power, a key concept in international relations and public policy, was proposed by 
Joseph Nye in his 1990 book “Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power” and 
further developed in “Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics”. The term refers to a 
country’s capacity “to shape the preferences of others” (2004, p.5) through the power of 
attraction rather than coercion. Unpacking the concept, Nye analyzes the term ‘power’ and 
defines it as “the ability to influence the attitude of others to get the outcomes one wants” (2004, 
p. 2). However, in contrast to Niccolo Machiavelli’s era, Nye proposes to win the hearts and 
minds not by the means of “carrots and sticks” but by attracting and seducing them. To Nye, a 
country that takes the advantage of the so-called “second face of power” (p. 5) gets what it 
wants, because “other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level 
of prosperity and openness – want to follow it” (p. 5). Hence, it is the ability to attract that gets 
others to ‘buy’ your values and arguments. Attraction is stated to have a similar effect as Adam 
Smith’s ‘invisible hand’, which leads people to make decisions in a free market. It “persuades to 
go along with others’ purposes without any explicit threat or exchange taking place” (p. 7). 
Nye asserts that attraction is produced by soft power resources, which he groups into 
three primary categories: “culture (in places where it is attractive to others), political values 
(when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and foreign policies (when they are seen as 
legitimate and having moral authority)" (p. 11). He further brings up the example of US popular 
culture to analyze cultural attractiveness, which has been transmitted through commerce, 
university exchange programs, personal contacts, etc. Predictably, its attractiveness significantly 
declined after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, as measured by public surveys. (p. 14).  
Nye admits that the concept of attractiveness has its limitations: one cannot always 
clearly observe the “attraction -> payoff” algorithm, because “attraction often has a diffuse 
effect, creating general influence rather than producing easily observable specific action” (p. 16). 
Likewise, there can be specific conditions and circumstances under which attraction leads to a 
desirable outcome. For example, attraction occurs when “power is dispersed in another country 
rather than concentrated” (p. 16) Thus, in authoritarian countries, political leaders "can often 
ignore whether another country is popular or not when he calculates whether it is in his interests 
to be helpful" (p.18). 
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Hence, attractiveness is a well-designed strategy. To obtain desired outcomes it is 
necessary to understand the broader landscape of the ‘game’.  Like in a human relationship, to 
seduce a partner or opponent, one needs to underline which resources work better for a particular 
object within a particular context. “Oil was not an impressive power resource before the 
industrial age nor was uranium significant before the nuclear age” (p. 3).   
Nye also introduces economic resources as being part of its concept. "Carrots" are 
incitements such as the reduction of trade barriers or an offer and a partnership. While "sticks" 
represent threats and coercive diplomacy. Ernest Wilson summarizes it as the ability to coerce 
"another to act in ways in which that entity would not have acted otherwise" (Ernest 2008). 
However, economic resources can produce hard military power as well as soft-power behavior. 
A successful economic model can finance military resources that are needed for the execution of 
hard power behavior. But it can also work in the other way, which is to attract other countries to 
imitate its example. One example is the European Union and its soft power abilities at the end of 
the Cold War and China's presence today. In both cases, EU and China owe much to the success 
of the EU and China's economic models.  
However, the concept of soft power should not be misused as a synonym for anything 
other than military force. Economic power can also be differentiated as soft economic power and 
hard economic power. Sanctions for example belong to hard economic power as they are 
intended to coerce. Also economic power that is used to finance the military is a mean of hard 
power. As a result economic power can be applied in a coercive way or a soft, seductive way. A 
successful economy can be as an important source of attraction as an appealing political model. 
Countries wishing to join the EU are considered to be a sign of the EU's soft power. Also 
European leaders believe that the changes and alterations Turkey is implementing in its human 
right policies and their domestic laws to conform to EU standards are signs of a successful soft 
power effect.  
Distinguishing between "soft" and "hard" can be difficult. For example, Janice Bially 
Mattern uses George W. Bush's phrase "you are either with us or with the terrorists" as an 
example showcasing the two sides and considers this particular statement as an execution of hard 
power. While in this case it was not the military forces that exercised pressure, Mattern argues 
that it threatened the identity of the allies. It forced them to comply otherwise they would be 
stigmatized as evil. Hard coercive power is rather consequential while soft power gives the 
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opponent the choice of either being attracted or not without facing the consequence of being 
punished by its opponent or partner. In sum, various types of power can be located on a one-
dimensional scale, with coercion and attraction at the hard and soft ends, respectively. Economic 
power can take the form of hard and soft power; its context is what defines it as hard or soft.  
Soft power is the power to attract. However, there is the question of what is the 
mechanism of generating attraction. Vuving (2008) defines three currencies that cause attraction: 
"beauty, brilliance, and benignity." Beauty is a characteristic of actors’ relations with "ideals, 
values, causes, or visions". Brilliance, on the other hand, is a feature of the actors' relations with 
their work. The third cause Vuving (2008) defines is benignity, which I consider as relevant for 
economic soft power. Its meaning is about the positive attitude when you treat a client. It is 
manifest in situations when you are nice and generous to others. When you help and support 
your client. While it triggers gratitude and sympathy, it also reassures your opponents or partners 
of your peaceful or benevolent intentions. As a result, it invites cooperation (Vuving, 2008). 
Even though benignity can be articulated rhetorically, it has stronger effects when using actions. 
Vuving (2008) asserts several forms of benignity such as economic aid and assistance or 
diplomatic support. One example of economic assistance is the funds transmitted through OFDI. 
But economic benefits can have different forms. For example in 1997, during the financial crisis, 
China decided not to devalue its currency. This step was considered as an act of benignity 
towards many regional countries. This boosted China's soft power in the region.  
Since the economic crisis in 2008, positions, perceptions and priorities started to shift. 
“Oil was not an impressive power resource before the industrial age nor was uranium significant 
before the nuclear age” (p. 3). After 2008, the demand for investments in the EU increased and 
China, who is holding the world's largest foreign currency reserves - 1.9 trillion US dollars - and 
with Shanghai's and Shenzhen's stock exchange markets not hit as hard as elsewhere, China 
suddenly stood out in a positive light. Even though China suffered from a fall in exports and its 
unemployment rates grew significantly, China managed to maintain economic growth and many 
countries, including EU, started knocking on China's doors for financial support. China's reaction 
was constructive and consequently "China's positive financial position has become a resource of 
soft power" (d'Hooghe, 2010). Beijing was clearly aware of this situation and took advantage of 
it during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's European trip in January and February 2009 during 
which he asserted several times China's confidence in its economic situation. He also highlighted 
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its "willingness to take responsibility in helping to solve the crisis and its readiness to cooperate 
with the international community in dealing with the crisis" (d'Hooghe, 2010). While China 
offered its investments without stating any specific conditions, expectations or potential 
consequences in form of economic sanctions in its context, China's investments in the EU gained 
the status of a soft power tool. 
            In my paper, I argue that the financial crisis generated a crucial momentum which 
enabled China to enter the EU market more freely and has put the EU in a more vulnerable 
position towards investments. Subsequently, the EU started to create not only a more market-
friendly environment for incoming Chinese OFDI, but also a more diplomatic environment for 
Chinese representatives.  
            A phenomenon that occurred as a result of the financial crisis is the high increase of 
Chinese OFDI in the EU: OFDI inflows in the EU tripled from 2006 to 2009 and tripled again by 
2011 to $10 billion for the year. The overall number of contracts with a value of over $1 million 
doubled from 50 to nearly 100 in 2010 and 2011. However, besides the well-known economic 
consequences, my argument implies that Chinese OFDI also created a political response on the 
EU side. A competition to attract Chinese OFDI started when it was uncertain whether its impact 
on political relations would be positive or negative. These new patterns of competition may 
mean a lowering of attention towards political discussions regarding human rights issues, and a 
shift in political priorities and public opinion towards China. When talking about China's “soft 
power” then, I exclude China's intentional use of its OFDI as a tool of soft power, and define 
Chinese OFDI as a component of the term “soft power” and therefore it may contribute to the 





            One of the specifications of socio-political attitude in the EU on the public level is a shift 
in public opinion towards China. China’s economic presence in the EU is rising. This affects the 
public in different ways, since there is a specific pattern of Chinese investments in the EU. The 
incoming OFDI focuses on bankrupt companies and has the characteristic of acquisitions. The 
positive political climate in the EU towards Chinese ODI follows after the Chinese investments 
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itself. Since the financial crisis left most of the EU countries without any investments, the 
unemployment rate increased drastically and left many industries and companies bankrupt. The 
EU seemed to be desperate for investors. China was one of the very few who had the capital to 
invest. As a result, Chinese SOEs have been largely welcomed in a region overwhelmed by 
recession and in desperate need of capital. The state fund CIC acquired a 10-percent stake in 
London's Heathrow Airport in 2012, and a 7-percent stake in the French satellite provider 
Eutelsat. In 2011, Portugal's authorities bargained its largest-ever privatization, agreeing to sell a 
21-percent stake in the immense power company Energias de Portugal to China's Three Gorges. 
Additionally, many small and mid-sized companies are crucial for the German economy. Small 
and midsized companies hope that these new partnerships will provide them with faster access to 
the Chinese market. As a result, even the EU governments are trying to promote the role of 
China in a better light. Public talks and media are showcasing China as an investor that has the 
potential to save Europe from its post crisis disease. As a result, with Chinas new presence and 
representation in Europe, the public opinion is shifting as well.  
 
 Consequently, I shall hypothesize that: 
 
1. Hypothesis: "The public attitude toward China in an EU country will improve with increasing 
Chinese OFDI in the country." 
 
 
           At the state-level, I define increased threats against human rights or EU norms on 
democracy and values to be my second specification. Human rights as well as democratic 
principles represent the main matter of dispute between the Chinese government and other 
democratic countries, the EU included. I expect to find cases in which EU decision makers act 
against norms and values that concern human rights or democracy and see a correlation to 
Chinese OFDI.  To summarize the variables and processes in describing how Chinese OFDI 
affects socio-political attitude towards China in the EU, I conclude that: 
 
2. Hypothesis: "Violations of human rights or EU norms in the EU will occur simultaneously 
with a high inflow of Chinese OFDI in the EU." 
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            Because my aim is to isolate the changes in socio-political attitude that are due to factors 
that stand in relation to the context of China-EU only, I have to control for variables which 
authors use when providing alternative explanations. This paper builds on an argument that is in 
contrast to the findings in previous literature where soft power is mainly associated with cultural 
factors. A majority of scholars consider China’s traditional culture, or its appealing alternative 
values in addressing international problems as the crucial resource for building soft power. 
Kurlantzick (2007) adds factors such as diplomacy, trade incentives, cultural and educational 
exchange opportunities, and other techniques to promote a national image of social and 
economic success which is able to attract stronger international players.  
To summarize, I use Joseph Nye’s (2004) country’s political and social values and its 
foreign policies as being the most representative term. Ingrid d’Hooghe argues that it is the 
rapidly developing public diplomacy strategy which strengthens China’s position in world 
politics and therefore contributes to its rise of soft power. Ahlquist and Prakash (2010) and Ilan 
Alon (2009) consider economic globalization and political transformation to be the reason for 
domestic policy realms to be influenced by foreign actors and by developments in foreign 
countries. Their argument would imply that through globalization and its processes, such as 
China’s access to WTO, China opened up to the world, which subsequently led to a rise of 
political as well as economical influence. The new contribution of this paper, the correlation 
between Chinese OFDI and the impact of China’s soft power, provides a new so far undervalued 
insight of possible effects of economic factors and relations on political dimensions. 
 
 
4.3 Political Relations and Foreign Direct Investment 
 
 For a better understanding of interstate relations and the political relevancy of Chinese 
OFDI, I briefly review the theoretical mechanism that link political relations and OFDI in 
general.  
One of the arguments that were initially introduced discusses the political nature of an 
investment environment initiated by the individual perception of investors from the home 
country.  The majority of home investors have the impression that host officials as well as the 
public fail to identify the interests of the government and investors from the same home country. 
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Consequently, investors must observe in detail every change in interstate cooperation or events 
that inform them with valuable information about host country environments. One of the few 
statistical analyses on OFDI by US enterprises argues with the words of Nigh (1985) that 
interstate conflicts tend to reduce US investments. On the other hand, interstate cooperation 
tends to increase the number of closed OFDI deals. 
Another argument that has been highlighted by Vaschilko (2010) is that it is the micro-
foundation that is shaped by interstate political relations. Once OFDI crosses a home country's 
borders, it involves at least two political jurisdictions. Also, bilateral political reasons influence 
the entry, exit and operation of international businesses.  
 
 
4.3.1. How Do Political Relations Affect Chinese Outbound Investment? 
 
 Chinese OFDI can be characterized looking at different factors such as firm, industry, 
location, and country (e.g., Buckley et al., 2007; Cheung and Qian, 2009; Duanmu, 2012; Eden 
and Miller, 2010; Gugler and Fetsherin, 2010; Kolstad and Wiig, 2012; Morck et al., 2007; 
Ramasamy et al., 2012). These factors can vary. On the state level, their political potential and 
relations, however, have often been overlooked.  
China, as one of the major powers in global politics, has a significantly growing strength 
which is created by maintaining and improving diplomatic ties around the world. After obtaining 
a permanent membership in the UN Security Council, China also proved its position in global 
governance.  Additionally, recent developments show that OFDI from China is facing new non-
commercial obstacles and opportunities.  
A significant amount of OFDI from China has been executed by SOEs targeting 
extractive industries. However, such investment is frequently affected by political issues both at 
home and abroad. The state-owned nature endows these central SOEs. However without strong 
governmental support they wouldn’t be happy to function. This support can be shown through 
"easy bank loans" and faster procedures. Consequently, Chinese investments are motivated by 
political reasons in association with government agendas.  
Institutional theory proposes that a company's behavior is to a certain extent based on its 
surroundings (Scott, 1995).   Chinese OFDI investors often have to consider interstate relations. 
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Without government's support and knowing its detailed procedures, it is almost impossible to 
conduct a feasibility study that evaluates political risk. Thus they are more likely to gain 
advantages from intergovernmental relations. Boisot and Meyer (2008) argue that Chinese 
investors can influence their institutional arbitrage when companies target efficient institutions 
outside their domestic market. Good political relations between home and host countries can be a 
basis for such an activity. 
 
 
4.3.2. State-owned Enterprises and their Dominant Role in Chinese ODI 
 
 While the behavior of Chinese companies investing abroad does not contradict general 
OFDI theories, the composition and the type of Chinese firms executing direct investment abroad 
differs. SOEs dominate Chinese OFDI. The reason can be linked to several factors, for instance, 
incumbent advantages or deficiencies in the domestic capital market. SOEs' ascendancy 
contributes to the explanation for most of the ODI patterns and developments that are unique in 
China.  
In 1978, all Chinese businesses were state owned or collectively owned. A slow 
privatization process followed after that. However, up till now, the central government, its 
agencies and affiliated businesses still own controlling shares in the majority of the businesses, 
and even though their relative importance has declined, SOEs continue to play a crucial role in 
China. China’s industrial policy still favors SOEs, which control leading industries that are key 
to China’s development strategy. SOEs tend to be large and often they are “natural monopolies,” 
controlling strategically important industries. SOEs are represented by 78 percent of Chinese 
OFDI. "Among 50 Chinese non-financial companies with the largest OFDI stock in 2010, 47 
were state-owned enterprises."(Li, 2012) 
One of the reasons why SOEs are still dominating the Chinese market is the significant 
advantages they have over private enterprises. Until 1998, OFDI was generally discouraged by 
the government. SOEs were the only units that were eligible for the little support from the 
government in their expansion abroad. On the other hand, OFDI by private companies is a 
comparatively new phenomenon. Also because SOEs keep close ties to the government and local 
officials, they have higher potential to coordinate the complex bureaucratic steps required for 
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approval for foreign investments. Furthermore, SOEs maintain a dominant position over 
financial resources. They represent the majority of bank loans and "half of the market value of 
companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges" (Li, 2012). In contrast, private 
firms have to rely mainly on venture capital, retained earnings and informal lending to fund 
expansion.  
The reason behind this pattern is that China's financial system is controlled by banks. The 
banks are again large state-owned banks. As a result, access to credit and loans for small, private 
firms is restricted. In contrast, SOEs' access to bank loans is offered in favorable terms that can 
be applied to expand the firm's activities abroad. "When state-owned banks make loan decisions, 
they may favor outward direct investors when the project aligns with China’s development 
strategy" (Li, 2012).  This in particular is the situation when applying for a loan at a policy 
development bank, since one of their pillars is the support of OFDI. It has to be taken into 
consideration that China's interest rates are not in accordance with the actual cost of capital 
demanded by investors and are not determined by market forces. Low rates are set by the 
government itself and therefore benefit SOE borrowers. Since loans are available at low cost, 
SOEs have greater motivation than private companies who lack access to financing to expand 
domestically and globally.  
 
 
4.3.3. State-owned Enterprises and the View on Private Enterprises 
 
 Chinese state-owned enterprises as well as private enterprises are involved in OFDI. The 
majority of the large-scale investment projects have been executed by Chinese SOEs. Cheng 
found that shares of OFDI flows carried out by SOEs under the Central Government were 73.5% 
(2003), 82% (2004) and 83.2% in 2005 (Cheng and Ma, 2007). The remaining shares of OFDI 
flows were divided into investments of SOEs administered by regional governments, non-SOEs 
owned collectively, and lastly, privately owned firms.  
Companies owned by regional governments such as the governments of Beijing or 
Guangdong are for instance TCL, and Beida Jade Bird (Cheng and Ma, 2007).  Another example 
could be Lenovo. While today it is already in private hands (yet not completely), during its 
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acquisition of IBM's computer business it was still in state ownership. This highlights the 
significant role of the Chinese government at different levels in bigger Chinese OFDI plans. 
 Additionally, until 2003, OFDI was permitted only for Chinese SOE (Buckley, et al., 
2007). This restricted the number of private Chinese firms invested abroad compared to SOEs 
significantly. Furthermore, the majority of OFDI plans were executed by SOEs because some 
industries could be closed or almost closed for private firms. In particular, almost all Chinese 
firms in the natural resource sphere are SOEs (Brett and Erricsson, 2006). Considering the 
significance of the minerals sector in Chinese OFDI, this represents an important element. 
 The evaluation by Morck represents a confirmation of the significant role the Chinese 
government plays in Chinese OFDI. He argues that Chinese private-sector firms can, to a certain 
extent, conduct OFDI. However, "the scale is too small to register" (Morck et. al., 2007 p. 22). In 
Morc's following observation, he notes that the majority of OFDI players overlap with the most 
profitable SOEs in China. The majority of OFDI is therefore carried out by Chinese SOEs. Those 
are the significant players in crucial industries in China. Commonly, they are "backed-up with an 
officially-sanctioned monopoly in their industry" (Gugler and Boie, 2012), such as natural 
resources, telecommunications or infrastructure (Morck et. al., 2008).  
 Finally, any type of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by any Chinese company needs to 
be approved by the Chinese authorities. Approval has to come from government bodies including 
MOFCOM, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), and the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) (Cheng and Ma, 2007). These approvals are 
required in the initial stage of the investment process and they need to be reviewed annually. 
Additionally, investment projects that are applying for an approval are expected to follow the 
guidelines of encouraged OFDI. However the application might be restricted if not rejected, for 
instance via foreign currency exchange limitations (Buckley, et al., 2007).  This procedure 
follows a specific goal. These restrictions give the government a certain guarantee that all 
investment activities, including those that are carried out by privately owned companies, fall 
within the strict lines of government policies. Reasonably, these factors have to be considered, 





CHAPTER V. Methodology 
 5.1. Data Collection and Unit of Analysis 
 
Public opinion 
Given that a shift in public opinion may indicate a rising intensity of soft power and a 
change in EU's socio-political attitude, I wish to investigate whether Chinese OFDI affected 
Chinese soft power within EU countries itself. To obtain data representative of the outcomes of 
the influence of Chinese OFDI on the societal level, I use data on public opinion from the Pew 
Research Global Attitudes Project gathered with opinion polls. Surveys evaluate the state 
through personal interviews with people from countries such as Poland, France, Spain, United 
Kingdom and Germany. My analysis investigates the pattern of responses regarding China as an 
economic partner of the EU and global actor, as well as views about the rise of China.   
Subsequently, this study represents a combined use of qualitative and quantitative data 
and methods, as an attempt to corroborate and complement findings for the purpose of a 
balanced approach to research.  
  
Governments  
As power is a relative and intangible concept, measurement of any country’s power or 
soft power is difficult. To quantify sources of change of socio-political attitude on the state level, 
I will analyze “government’s actions and reactions” to prove my hypotheses. When analyzing 
governments and their decision makers, I mainly use a collection of qualitative data. Through 
this, I aim to observe governments and their representatives in their choice of ambiguity or 
ignorance with regard to human rights and actions, which favors Chinese values and diplomacy 
rather than EU norms and values. In other words, their prioritization of human rights issues is 
expected to be lower when China's presence is involved. The countries that I investigate are 
Serbia, Romania and Hungary. Data on China’s OFDI were collected from the 2010 Statistical 






CHAPTER VI. View on Actorness and the Role of Chinese Government in Chinese ODI 
 
 In order to argue that the Chinese OFDI that are executed via Chinese SOEs are directly 
linked to political outcomes and the interests of China and its government, it is important to 
understand the role of Chinese government as an actor in relation to the units that carry out the 
investment.  
 In order to analyze China’s "actorness", I will elaborate the approach developed by 
Jupille and Caporaso (1998). Also, I will add an elaboration by Bretherton and  Vogler (1999, 
2006). Although, the term "actorness" was developed in order to evaluate EU as an actor in 
international affairs, it contains aspects that can be applicable to China's and its government's 
position towards Chinese OFDI on its domestic level, albeit in a limited form.  
 The core that is highlighted by Jupille and Caporaso (1998) comprises four basic 




 For example, in the case of recognition, Jupille and Caporaso (1998) explain that 
"recognition is understood as the acceptance of and interaction with the entity by others". While 
they further contemplate about the "global actorhood" (Jupille and Caporaso, 1988), their 
conclusive message is with regards to "recognition by others". This means that the third parties, 
in making the decision to interact with the actor, implicitly endow recognition upon it.  
For instance, although there are no specific restrictions in the type of company that one 
can establish in China, the government and its state owned institutions are still considered to be 
the easiest and most efficient way to gain access to resources and the significant majority of 
companies decide to let the state hold most of its shares. This could be considered as a vertical 
example that showcases the relationship between the state and its units. A rather horizontal 
example indicating recognition of the role of the government in relation to its ODI on the 
international level is the case of Chinalco in 2008. Reasonably, Chinese firms also seek to 
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maximize their profit. Yet, it is not considered as their first priority. Rather, they are expected to 
pursue government goals.  
This triggers new fears among foreign governments. When Chinalco bought 9% of the 
Australian mining firm Rio Tinto in 2008, the Australian Treasurer, Wayne Swan created 
immediately guidelines for foreign investors. As an explanation for this step, he stated that the 
Australian government requires a guarantee that proposes investment plans are "based on 
commercial motives and were not intended to advance strategic or political objectives" (Drysdale 
and Findlay, 2009). This message signifies well that China is communicating its investment 
structure well enough and even on the international level the government is recognized as an 
important factor behind Chinese OFDI. 
 Adding to that, the whole system of state owned companies can be linked to identity too. 
What does China want to be recognized as? Through state ownership, China can build up a 
remarkable network of external representation. Not only at China’s domestic regional level, but 
through globalization of its SOEs, its representation can reach out on an international scale.  
 
 Authority 
 The second element that Jupille and Caporaso (1988) identify is authority. Explicitly, 
they relate authority particularly with the sense of "legal competence to act in a given subject 
matter" (Jupille and Caporaso, 1988). While authority and recognition might play a separate role 
in a democracy with a more open market, in China those two terms can overlap. An example of 




 The third subject is autonomy. Jupille and Caporaso (1998) argue that for "an 
international organization to be an actor, it should have a distinctive institutional apparatus, even 
if it is grounded in, or intermingles with, domestic political institutions". Does the Chinese 





 Lastly, cohesion is understood as the extent to which a unit can "formulate and articulate 
internally consistent policy preferences". Jupille and Caporaso (1998) distinguish between four 
categories of cohesion: value (goal) cohesion, tactical cohesion, procedural cohesion and output 
cohesion: "Value cohesion simply refers to the similarity or compatibility of basic goals. If goals 
are somewhat different but can be made to fit with one another … , we speak of tactical cohesion 
(...) procedural cohesion implies some consensus on the rules and procedures used to process 
issues where conflict exists (...) if member states succeed in formulating policies, … more 
cohesion is said to exist … [and] output cohesion will be affected by the level of agreement on 
goals and procedures as well as the degree to which it is possible to link issues tactically" (Jupille 
and Caporaso, 1998).  
 The corporate ownership structure of Chinese companies can communicate the state 
embeddedness in a very explicit way. Even though private companies in China have ownership 
structures that are comparable to those in developed countries, every SOE has a parallel structure 
to the board of directors which is the party committee.  The party committee is led by the party 
secretary that rules the committee and has the supremacy to remove or assign directors of the 
firm, usually chosen from the party committee itself (Morck, 2008). 
 Among the chief executives of China's top 53 SOEs, more than 70% are politically active 
and have a high ranked political career. In September 2012, "Zhang Guangning, a former 
Guangzhou mayor and party secretary of Guangzhou, was elected as chairman of Anshan Iron 
and Steel Group which represents the second-largest steel maker in China."
3
 Also China Grain 
Reserves Corporation's chairman Zhao Shunglian has held key roles in various posts in Inner 
Mongolia, as well as being the vice chairman of the autonomous region. 30% of the chief 
executives of the top SOEs are Central Committee members or members of the Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection. Today, they are the chief executives of central firms in 
aerospace, ship building, steel and petrochemical and all other critical industries. Besides the 
idea that through this, the government will have better control over all kinds of business 
activities, officials with government experience are considered as specialists that understand 
local conditions well enough and are more grounded in pragmatic decision making.  
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 The structural embeddedness of the government has direct implications for general 
business strategy. Party officials are in direct control. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, 
investment plans have to be in accordance with political objectives, but this does not ensure 
successful long-term economic performance. Yet, large scale investment projects that go hand in 
hand with political goals are generally a good strategy for career boosts within the central 
bureaucracies. This is the case even if they aren't profitable in the long run. 
  Jupille and Caporaso also note with regard to the EU that horizontal conflicts such as 
disagreements between member states and EU institutions could affect the above discussed 
forms of cohesion, and might affect the flexibility of the EU to act. This can be linked to the 
argument of Holland (1995), which states that if the EU encounters events in which it lacks clear 
central authority, it could affect the EU’s actorness. In the case of China and its investments, all 
SOE activities are linked to the government and state objectives. If SOEs start pursuing purely 
profit oriented ODI, China would experience a significant shortage of resources and lack of 
technology. This would affect the industry as well as the public, which would lead to a 
weakening of the government's authority and its centralized political and economic role. 
 
 
6.1. The Role of the State 
 
 The Chinese economy can be considered as a hybrid that is juggling between a centrally 
planned economy and market economy. Therefore, the role of the state can be better understood 




 Despite policy shifts which have eased restrictions and led to a gradual opening up, 
compared to other countries, China's economy is still highly regulated. This applies especially 
for state-owned enterprises. ODI used to be limited or strictly discouraged by China's central 
authorities. This was the case until the late 1990s.  After the year 2000 the Chinese government 
remodeled its goals and highlighted its "go global" policy. To understand the transition of 
China's position, Chinese ODI can be represented by five phases: 
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 Stage One (1979-83) 
 During this period of time, only SOEs and provincial and municipal-based corporations 
were given the permission to invest beyond the domestic borders. Also, this was possible only on 
a case by case basis. At this stage, only the State Council had the authority to either approve or 
disapprove ODI activities.  
 
 Stage Two (1984-1992) 
 At this stage, China showed the first signs of a gradual opening, including standardization 
of approval mechanisms. After 1984, some limitations and prohibitions against ODI started to be 
lifted step by step. As a result, non-state firms initiated investments overseas. Nevertheless, the 
Regulations on Examination and Approval of Project Proposal and Feasibility Report on FDI 
Projects, published by the State Planning Commission in August of 1991, did not allow for the 
autonomy of a Chinese firm's ODI by introducing compound procedures and complex fund 
limitations (Perkins, 1994).  
 
 Stage Three (1993-1998) 
 Due to several financial fiascos caused by Chinese firms speculating on Hong Kong real 
estate as well as the stock market, Chinese government decided for even stricter regulations on 
ODI to avoid future debacles and to ensure that the capital is used for "genuinely productive 
purposes" only (Yao and He, 2005). Nevertheless, when Deng Xiaoping started his Southern tour 
in 1992, he also started to push Chinese enterprises to continue with their ODI strategies and to 
expand abroad. In September 1992, during the Fourteenth National Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), Secretary Jiang Zemin officially proclaimed that "we should encourage 
enterprises to expand their investment abroad and their transnational operations” (Cheng and 
Stough, 2007). 
 
 Stage Four (1999-2002) 
 This phase is characterized as the early stage of the "go global" policy when investments 
increased their trade activities overseas. The Chinese government started to support and 
encourage firms whose business plan would support China's export force.  Light industries, 
particularly textiles, machinery and electrical equipment firms were expected to establish 
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manufacturing factories overseas and use materials from China. The companies that were given 
the permission to expand were granted "export tax rebates, foreign exchange assistance and 
financial support" (Garrick, 2012). Subsequently, this momentum was supported by making the 
administrative procedures more efficient (Wu, Hsien-Ling and Chien-Hsun Chen, 2001). 
 
 Stage Five (2002 -2008) 
 In 2002, the "go global" strategy was officially approved at the CCP's 16th Congress. The 
main goal was to encourage domestic firms to join international capital markets and to expand 
their investments overseas (Boisot, 2004). China was up till 2008 the only government in Asia 
which explicitly promotes investment in R&D (Rui and Hi, 2008). 
 
 
6.1.1. The Major State-Owned Players 
 
 It is the state-owned enterprises that are still prominent among China’s ODI. One of the 
first Chinese MNEs were large SOEs. Large SOEs were working mainly in monopolized 
industries such as financial services, shipping, international trading or natural resources. The 
second generation of Chinese MNEs focused mainly on manufacturing industries (Haier, TCL, 
Huawei, ZTE). These enterprises were also ostensibly under the control and supervision of the 
Chinese government (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). 
 By the end of 2005, 81 per cent of China’s ODI stock was SOEs that were directly 
managed by the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC).
4
 According 
to MOFCOM, out of the 7,000 Chinese firms whose investments are active abroad, only about 
10 per cent are small private firms (AFII/Matthieu 2006). Lenovo is the only one not explicitly 





                                                 
4
 SASAC was established in 2003. Its purpose was to turn the country’s top SOEs under state's control into 50 
global MNEs. Pamlin, D. and Long, B. (2007): Re-think–China’s Outward Investment Flows, WWF, April. 
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6.1.2. How important is the state behind SOE strategies? 
 
 The ‘go global’ policy was introduced to enable favored enterprises the access to a 
generally complimenting budget with fewer constraints involved. Yet, administrative and 
bureaucratic obstacles remain. A FIAS survey that interviews Chinese investors (private as well 
as public) published that about 44 percent of enterprises criticized the application time involved 
in ODI and 24 percent were held back by the costs involved in conforming to procedures and 
regulations (Yao and He, 2005).  
 It has to be noted that although the major overseas investors used to be SOEs, it is not 
always the enterprises which get the most support from the government that are internationally 
the most successful. For example the Chinese MNEs such as Huawei and Haier are by now very 
well settled overseas and have a strong position; however they were not preselected by the 
government as part of the "go global" policy. That means they were not eligible for the state 
benefits either. They are however an exception among Chinese ODIs (Deng, 2009).  
 
 
6.1.3. Chinese Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
 One of the more significant moves undertaken by the Chinese Government was the 
establishment of a sovereign wealth fund, the Chinese Investment Corporation (CIC). The CIC 
was launched officially in October 2007 with an initial capital of US$ 200 billion. It was placed 
under the direct control of the State Council and is permitted to invest some of China’s large 
foreign reserves. The CIC was established using the model of the Singapore investment firm 
Temasek Holdings. The intention of the CIC is to function on the domestic as well as overseas 
market. The majority of its early stage investments were targeted to Latin America and Asia, 







CHAPTER VII. The Role of the Global Financial Crisis in Relation to Chinese OFDI 
 
The global financial crisis in 2008 has had a major impact on the European Union and 
affected the attitude and flow of investors in general, while it enhanced the “shift in global 
economic power to emerging economies” (Hanemann and Rosen, 2012). As Alica Sorroza and 
Pablo Bustelo (2011) described, China, in addition to its growing status as an economic and 
trading power, is also gaining a new role as an influential international financial power. During 
the last few years, China has excerted its economic power in the political sphere and, thus, is 
seeking more impact in international institutions as well as economic forums. Several World 
Bank reports refer to data according to which the annual average GDP growth has been much 
higher in China than in the rest of the world. Furthermore, China’s economic growth performed 
exceptionally well since 1980 with an average annual GDP growth rate of 10%, and contributed 
to Asia’s shift in global GDP from 17.6% in 1980 to 26.7% in 2010.   Yet, despite China’s 
growing importance, the multiple interests involved in the EU’s relationship with China makes it 
rather problematic to establish a European policy towards the Asian giant. The fact that the EU is 
not developing a more comprehensive policy towards China might cause limitations in their 
bilateral relations.  
 However, the financial crisis has changed the pattern of the EU’s interests towards China, 
which has until recently represented just a distant trading partner. Moreover, it seems that China 
has altered its tactic towards Europe, using its economic and financial power to gain more 
influence (Sorroza, 2011)  
The year of the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008 also highlighted the end of 
the OFDI cycle. The OFDI were put under pressure as the financing of intended as well as 
existing deals, projects and takeovers became tougher and riskier. During the peak of the crisis in 
2008, developed economies experienced a reduction of OFDI by one-third, whereas developing 
economies, vulnerable hence less affected, witnessed an impact later (Fillipov and Kallotay, 
2009).  
Up until the outbreak of the crisis, it has been the EU, US and Japan that played the 
leading role in global investment, accounting with an overall 72% of OFDI stock, while 
emerging economies shared 2% of total global outflows. However, after the breakout of the 
economic crisis, emerging economies skipped the rankings and in 2010 they were seeding 17% 
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of global OFDI flows. As a result, the economic crisis brought about a new change in global 
capital flows while giving rise to the emerging market outward investment. In this series of 
events, China reached outstanding statistical achievements. Unlike other economies, China and 
its OFDI was boosted tremendously after the outbreak of the crisis, and as a result China was 
able to compete in the top ranks with its developed rivals. China’s share in global OFDI flows 
increased from less than 3% in 2008 to 5% in 2010 and it positioned itself as the fifth biggest 
outward investor. China is not only the only developing economy in this ranking, but it was also 
the only BRIC country whose OFDI flow did not experience a drastic drop during the economic 
crisis (Hanemann, 2012).  
However, some clarifications regarding China’s importance have to be made. Chinese 
OFDI cannot be considered as unique, as they have trailed a historical development which is 
rather typical for a developing country.
5
 Also, as Tilo and Hanemann (2012) claim, this trend 
does not necessarily represent a “phenomenon born out of the global financial crisis” because 
“the trend precedes the crisis by more than half a decade” (Hanemann and Rosen, 2012). Also, in 
terms of foreign investment in China’s economy itself, the greed of going global does not 
represent a unique move. However, its large scope acquires a different character and introduces 
new implications when interrupted and followed by the financial crisis. 
Yet the Chinese economy didn’t remain untouched by the Global Financial Crisis and 
also experienced a fall in its growth; especially in the third quarter of 2008 when the export 
market suddenly collapsed and Chinese FDI inflow weakened by around $30 billion as a 
consequence of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. However, capital already started to flow back 
into China in the beginning of 2009 (De Beule and Bulcke Van Den, 2009).  The strong OFDI 
growth during and after the outbreak of the crisis can be related to the strong recovery of the 
                                                 
5
 In the pre-reform stage, the number of cross border capital flows is zero as there is no interest on the side of 
foreign investors and domestic companies do not have any foreign exchange to invest abroad. After the country 
introduces economic reforms which allow for domestic growth, foreign investors tend to drive money into a high-
growth economy. In the third stage domestic firms target their investments abroad as the home country reached a 
particular level of per capita GDP and the home market becomes limited. That leads to an OFDI take off, while 
inward FDI stays strong. Once the outward FDI is higher than inward FDI, a home country’s net FDI state turns 
from negative into positive territory. If a country hits a developed economy per capita GDP, its net FDI balances out 
and floats around the center, that is defined by a country’s economic cycles and structures. See Dunning, Kim and 
Park (2008) for the IDP theory and the position of FDI of emerging economies.  
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 Indeed, when we summarize and follow up on China’s development in numbers, we see a 
steady upward trend starting from the end of the 1970s, with an average rate of 9% per annum 
and overtaking the United States as Japan’s largest trading partner in 2004, India’s in 2008, and 
on top of that Brazil’s in 2009. In the same time frame, China became the largest foreign owner 
of American government debt (Men, 2009).  
Compared to its economic rivals, China has already been showing “better” results in 
terms of its growth for the past decade, and therefore to a certain degree, a consensus could be 
reached with Tilo and Haneman’s (2012) argument regarding China as an overvalued actor in the 
scene of international economy, as its current positive development reflects nothing more than 
the development of the pre-crisis phase.  
However, the character of this argument changes when looking at the processes that have 
occurred after the outbreak of the crisis. While the United States, EU and China were all growing 
before the crisis, it was China that continued to grow during the great recession. The floundering 
of the U.S. and EU economies is what caused a sudden imbalance, and rather than China 
becoming stronger, it is the other players that are becoming weaker.
7
 Hence, this does not imply 
that China is a peer competitor to the United States and EU.  
The financial crisis has become crucial in the EU and in the Eurozone especially during the 
time the Euro crisis occurred and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) had to be 
established as a tool to handle and balance out this situation. Nevertheless, the financial 
contribution of EU members didn’t lead to significant improvements and China started to appear 
                                                 
6
 Consequently, the reason for the fast recovery of China’s economy from the crisis can be tracked down to policy 
responses China undertook to prevent a further slowdown. In November 2008, the government began to implement 
a very large stimulus package and the PBOC introduced expansionary monetary policy steps by introducing a 4 
trillion Yuan ($580 billion) stimulus package meant for 2009 and 2010 which accounted for 14% of GDP. 
Additionally to government’s actions, regional and provincial governments were called to raise money to implement 
own stimulus packages. As a result, local governments were able to announce an 18 trillion Yuan package. These 
measures were considered to target the Chinese economy’s dependence on external demand which represented its 
central weakness. Although there is a remarkable lack of any reference regarding the effectiveness of any of the 
elements of the strategy to boost the economy, such as the stimulation of domestic demand, China managed to keep 
growth rates above 8% even after the crisis outbreak which on the other hand could be considered as evidence of a 
certain level of effectiveness of crisis management measures.  
7
 However, the long term effects of the crisis cannot be forecast yet. The World Economic Forum still rates the U.S. 
economy as the “world’s second most competitive” (considering factors such as the flexibility of the labor market, 




as a potential contributor, especially after expressing its interest in offering crisis management 
support in March 2011 to those EU members which were hit the hardest, Portugal and Spain in 
particular (Mezo and Udvari, 2012). Subsequently, China and its potential capabilities started to 
appear in a different light. Especially in times when investors started to leave the EU market, 




CHAPTER VIII. EU’s Experience with Chinese OFDI during the Global Financial Crisis 
 
The fact that the economic crisis affected global flows of OFDI cannot be denied. However, 
it also changed its scope, as a growing share was taken up by the developing countries and 
emerging markets with a share of 54%, while the developed economies’ share amounting only to 
40% registered a significant downturn. China, the crucial emerging market OFDI recipient, 
experienced a drop of only 18% compared to 25% for Brazil. While China’s interest was mainly 
in outbound investment into Asia and other developing regions such as Africa and South 
America, Europe had hardly experienced any activity in any type of investments or trade 
agreements. Subsequently, the year 2008 represented in terms of investments an unprecedented 
case. While the EU economy and its OFDI were suffering, 256 deals were signed with Western 
European business with an overall value of 45 billion. The uniqueness of those deals is that the 
buyers of those businesses were from emerging markets (De Beule and Bulcke Van Den, 2009). 
Before the crisis, China’s OFDI was focused mostly in developing regions where it has been 
rising fast, even after the crisis outbreak. However, Chinese investment in the EU has been 
increasing significantly, especially during the financial crisis. According to the table below, it 
can be observed that China’s tendency in the post crisis phase has been to prioritize Europe, 
covering all 27 member states of the EU, over the US market (Sorroza, 2011; Mezo and Udvari, 
2012). 
It is clear that the trend of Chinese OFDI has changed. Also, it can be observed that this 
change occurred especially during the economic crisis. Chinese OFDI in Europe, especially in 
Mediterranean countries, has increased significantly and very quickly. Europe became the 
recipient of many trade agreements and this phenomenon continued until the end of 2011. 
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Mediterranean countries account for 30% of the total amount of Chinese OFDI in Europe. This 
significance can be understood once the size of these economies is considered.
8
 
It is also possible to observe a shift in EU's attitude toward China. In particular, East and 
South East EU members attract the attention of scholars, as until a few years ago (especially 
before the crisis), these regions had “no relevant interest in China” (Sorroza, 2011). With the 
crisis, more and more EU countries started to seek the attention of China and its investment or 
debt purchases to overcome the crisis (Sorroza, 2011). It seems to scholars and policy makers 
that China has understood the necessity of strengthening its presence in Europe and chose the 
right momentum to become more influential there. China is taking advantage of this critical 
phase and is applying a similar strategy to the one used in developing countries (Sorroza, 2011). 
This raises questions for the EU regarding its possible vulnerability, and whether this type of 
new cooperation could get EU into a dependent position (Mezo and Udvari, 2012). 
Interestingly, because the financial crisis affected each EU member differently, a certain 
level of competition between EU member states for Chinese sovereign funds and OFDI can be 
observed. This inconsistency in the policy making process and eventual trade regulations makes 
the establishment of a clear EU policy toward China rather difficult. To a certain extent, this 
inconsistency and competition gives China more freedom in strengthening ties and choosing EU 
countries in which the particular advantage and deal would bring better profit and results, such as 
a full market status. While most of the EU members, East EU members in particular, 
acknowledge the relative loss of their relevance in the global economy, China understands that 
the EU as a whole is still the world’s key trade bloc and holder of capital and assets and political 
leadership for major organizations (Mezo and Udvari, 2012).
9
 Gaining access to one country 
could represent the gate to China’s new political and economic status. Additionally, these 
convenient conditions and EU’s weakness enable China to reduce its exposure to the US while 
                                                 
8
 Grisons Peak Merchant Bank (2011), China Outbound Investment Research Report, Quarterly Feature,  
vol. 9 (Q1). 
9
 It also has to be noted that China could experience large losses if the euro depreciated. That would lead to a less 
worth of the Chinese investment. This reason why China hast to support the Eurozone and maintain the value of the 
Euro is important and shouldn’t be undermined.  
34 
 






CHAPTER IX. Socio-Political Attitude and China’s Soft Power in Discussion of China’s 
Economic Presence in the EU 
 
While it is still unusual to relate the idea of soft power with China, as China’s active presence 
in the EU represents only a recent phenomenon and it is too early to confirm any prediction, the 
term soft power is slowly entering the official language even in China. In October 2007, during 
President’s Hu Jintao’s speech to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC), he noted that the CPC has to “enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country, a 
factor of growing significance in the competition in overall strength” (Nye, 2009).  
China has always been culturally attractive, thanks to its distinct traditions and language; 
however the government understands that it needs to build its influence in popular culture as 
well. During the past decade, the number of foreign students entering China’s educational 
institutions tripled, and tourism in China grew significantly. China also raises awareness about 
its culture abroad. As a result, several hundreds of Confucius Institutes have been established 
around the world to teach Chinese language, culture, and business etiquette. Additionally, China 
Radio International extended its broadcasts in English to 24 hours a day (Wuthnow, 2012 and 
2009) and spent 8.9 billion Yuan for “external publicity work” which includes a 24 hour news 
channel “Xinhua” which is supposed to serve as competitor to al Jazeera (Shambaugh, 2010). In 
terms of diplomacy, China has become more aware of the necessity to adjust its diplomacy. Just 
a decade ago, it started to join multilateral arrangements. China joined the WTO, sent more than 
3000 troops to serve in UN peacekeeping operations and has became more considerate in non-
proliferation diplomacy such as the Six-Party Talks on North Korea. China also “emphasized 
symbolic relationships, high-profile gestures, such as rebuilding the Cambodian Parliament and 
                                                 
10
 The general suspects regarding the rise of China’s influence proof certain sensitivity toward China’s new role. 
“The statement from the Chinese government that “China does not want to buy Europe” shed a light on the growing 
ambiguity of Europe-China relationships.” See: http://www.europeanbusinessreview.com/?p=5858 
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the Mozambique Foreign Affairs Ministry. These steps were needed to eliminate other countries' 
fear of China at least to a certain degree (Kurlantzik, 2007).  
However, China is also struggling with its efforts to build soft power relations. Its 
continuous embargos in Tibet, Xianjiang, including its resistance toward human rights activists 
and freedom of speech keep undermining its soft power gains. As a result, there is no 
international audience for its broadcasting projects such as Xinhua and China Central Television 
and their purpose of propaganda is only barely fulfilled. Its movie industry is limited mainly to 
storylines set in contemporary China, as alternative storylines would be neutered by censors 
(Dyer, 2012). Another example of the ineffectiveness of China’s use of soft power can be 
mentioned in the anniversary of the naval exploration of the Ming Dynasty Admiral Zheng in 
2006. They tried to establish a consensus which would justify their modern expansions into the 
Indian Ocean. However, this move didn’t create or increase any soft power in India. On contrary, 
it resulted into a rather mistrustful climate (Yoshihara and Holmes, 2009). Beginning in 2009, 
China invested significant efforts establishing competition with the giants such as Bloomberg, 
Time Warner, Viacom and invested billions of dollars to achieve this goal, believing in the use of 
“soft power, rather than military might to win friends abroad.” (Nye, 2011). This attempt failed 
as it was mired by domestic political censorship. Similarly as in the case of Xinhua and China 
Central Television, it lacked an international audience (Barboza, 2009) and did not fulfill its 
purpose of propaganda.  
Consequently, a poll taken in Asia in 2008 revealed that China’s soft power is still below the 
levels of United States and lacked effectiveness (The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2009). 
The intended soft power China used had only little effect and did not lead to positive results in 
terms of public opinion. However, with the financial crisis, certain conditions changed.  
Although US soft power remained significant despite being blamed for the Global Financial 








CHAPTER X. Data on Public Opinion 
 
Data on public opinion were collected from the Pew Research Global Attitudes Project. 
The question about opinion toward China was: “Please tell me if you have a very favorable, 
somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of China. Here, 
“Favorable” combines "very favorable" and "somewhat favorable" responses. “Unfavorable” 
combines "very unfavorable" and "somewhat unfavorable”.11 
 
 
Figure 1.1  China’s OFDI flows (millions of USD) and  Favorable Public opinion on China 







                                                 
11
 Data on public opinion were derived from Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, available at 
http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=24 
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From figure 1.1. it is evident that the soft power tools China has been using for the past 
decade has not shown any positive results. Data on public opinion from countries like Poland, 
United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, and France
13
 show that before 2008, the favorable opinion 
toward China was either very low, declining or inconsistently fluctuating despite China’s 
attempts of implementation of soft power tools and its “Go Global” strategy. The scope of tools 
has been broad: Cultural and language institutes, boosts in media, public propaganda, political 
diplomacy, etc.  
 Hence, the impact on public opinion was still very low. After 2009, each country showed 
a steady rise in favorable public opinion toward China, rising without any interruption for four 
consecutive years. While eliminating other soft power tools as a potential variable for rising 
public opinion, the sudden economic presence in the form of Chinese OFDI in the EU could be 
therefore related to the rather favorable view toward China.  
 It was at the end of 2008 that Chinese investments and the Chinese economic presence 
gained such a volume. Importantly, China’s economic presence has been more visible after the 
outbreak of the crisis in 2008, thanks to a high ODI inflow in the EU. This may lead to a change 
in how China is portrayed in the media in the EU. China has gained the status of a strong 
economic player and the public perspective has changed accordingly. 
 
 
                                                 
13
 I had to limit the number of countries to five due to lack of data 
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 10.1. Spain’s experience with China's economic presence 
 
 The case of Spain provides a better idea of the possible relation between public opinion 
toward China and Chinese investments in the EU. During the financial crisis, Spain was the EU 
member that was hit the hardest. The effects included the bankruptcy of major companies, which 
significantly affected the unemployment rates, which rose to 27% by 2013 and represents the 
highest rate of unemployment in the industrialized world (Ortega and Penalosa, 2012; Suarez, 
2010). 
 Spain also became the country with the highest youth unemployment in the EU which 
reached 57.22% in 2013 (Bilefsky, 2013). The awareness of the dire economic state of the 
country hit its peak when Alberto Fabra, the PP president of the regional government declared 
the government has found that it has no money to be able to guarantee the welfare state. Consider 
that about 1.4 million unemployed receive unemployment benefits while there are still four out 
of ten of the 4.77 million who do not receive any economic help. Spain also entered an economic 
recovery program which involved further financial loans from the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) and in 2013 a discussion regarding possible bank bailouts started (Ortega and Penalosa, 
2012). 
  Since the rest of the EU also faced recession followed by the Euro crisis, getting 
financial support from investors seemed unlikely for Spain. Although China has never been an 
active investor in Spain, 2008 brought sudden but welcome interest in the country from Chinese 
investors. Surprise was especially felt when after Spain's public debt started to reach record 
levels in mid-2011, China openly stated that it will continue buying Spanish government bonds 
and assist in funding a reorganization of Spain's savings banks. 
 In the beginning of 2013, Spanish officials announced that China finalized a purchase of 
six billion Euros of Spanish public debt. The government also openly discussed the struggle to 
reach out to international investors for the savings banks, which were also affected by debts. 
Here, China's sovereign wealth fund started to play an important role, as few sources reported 
that China's SWF and several private investors did discuss and research potential investments of 
13 billion in Spain's banks. As a result Spain discovered China as a potential "savior", as it is 
called not only in the Spanish but also EU media, motivated the Spanish government to 
undertake further steps to attract Chinese investments more actively (Suarez, 2010). 
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 One example is the imitation of agreements established in Portugal, Ireland and Hungary, 
where citizenship and permanent residence documents are issued to non-EU nationals under the 
condition of investment in properties of 400.000, 500.000 and 250.000 Euros worth of a special 
issued bond. It is expected that this step will attract mainly the interest of Chinese investments. 
Spanish companies in particular talk about China in a rather positive tone. They express relief 
and consider Chinese investments rather as help and a form of financial assistance especially 
because it is coming "in times when Spain needs more support". China keeps expressing its 
vision of diversifying the investments regularly in the media as well (Suarez, 2010; Latham, 
2013) 
 As a result, in the beginning of 2013, Spain signed several agreements that included areas 
which were affected by the crisis the most. Words such as "savior", "help", "assistance", 
"economic lifeline", "welcoming", "need", "ties" that are used by the media when talking about 
their political relationship: China as a financial supporter for Spain.  
 In summary, when it comes representing China-Spain relations in the Spanish or EU 
media, it is done in an overall positive tone. While the Spanish industry and governments are 
rather cohesive in terms of the perception toward China's economic presence in Spain, the view 
of the Spanish society is also shaped by an additional factor other than media. The Spanish 
economy has been experiencing a new source of strength during the crisis: Chinese immigrants. 
Bloomberg published an article in which an analysis reveals activities of immigrants from China 
in Cob Calleja. Almost all of the shopkeepers and wholesalers are Chinese and in spite of the 
incredibly high unemployment rates among the Spanish, only 2.9% of all Chinese residents were 
unemployed in 2010, compared to 16.5% of Spanish nationals and 24.5% of all foreigners. In 
Spain, the Chinese account for 23% of the "country's foreign-born entrepreneurs". While most of 
the immigrants left Spain in 2008 when the housing market collapsed, there were nearly 18,000 
new Chinese immigrants who arrived in Spain at the end of 2010, and encountered just little 
problems with finding work (Latham and Wu, 2013; Bilefsky, 2013). 
 One of the reasons for this fast adjustment process is the fact that Chinese communities in 
Spain are less state dependent and do not seek much support from the state's welfare system, but 
rather cooperate as families or communities with each other. Between 2007 and 2011, the 
number of legal Chinese workers increased by 41%. On the other hand, it was the employed 
Moroccans and Ecuadoreans, the largest foreign immigrant minority, which fell by 23% and 
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52%, respectively. As a result of foreign friendly investment politics and a Chinese minority 
history, 30% of foreigners who started a business were Chinese, while the number of houses sold 
to Chinese in 2012 doubled (Bilefsky, 2013). 
 However, the welcoming attitude of the locals toward Chinese immigrants also played a 
role. During the times of the financial crisis, omnipresent low-margin Chinese bazaars, shops, 
and hairdressers became tempting and attractive to cost-conscious Spanish consumers. 
Additionally, because Chinese immigrants numbered fewer and were not state or welfare 
dependent at all, the Spanish do not consider them as burdensome for their own economy. 
Furthermore, the media had a rather positive influence on the Spanish people’s attitude toward 
the Chinese and China's presence.  
 Looking at Spain's data, we can observe that after Chinese investments started to rise in 
2008, the public opinion started to improve as well. Although we can observe an occasional rise 
in investments before 2008 even in other countries, public opinion didn't necessarily start to rise 
accordingly. It was only after 2008, when negative conditions were brought upon the countries 
through the financial crisis that China started to be seen as a needed economic actor and in the 
media presented as the "only" one that was open to offer help to them. With its new economic 
importance, China gained a new status in the eyes of the country's society. Any form of help was 
needed, and to the public, it seemed China was the only one which had the adequate resources. 
 
Hypothesis: “The public attitude toward China in an EU country will improve with increasing 
Chinese OFDI in the country.” 
 
 
CHAPTER XI. Human Rights, EU values and Case Studies from Central and East 
European Union countries; the importance of East EU countries 
 
 The countries that joined the latest EU enlargement process in 2004 (the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus) and 2007 
(Bulgaria, Romania) consist mainly of former communist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. This shared background and the less developed character of these countries triggered 
reasonable concerns during the enlargement process itself, especially on the side of old EU 
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member states. Despite the unequal economic potential between the 2004 and 2007 accession 
countries and the EU-15, the newly gained political power of the new members exceeded its 
economic significance. However, all new members gained an equal access to the EU custom 
union, which eliminated all existing tariffs between old and new member countries as well as the 
internal market which enforces the four principal freedoms, such as free movement of people, 
goods, services and capital.  Additionally, the new members represent low-wage locations in the 
EU and therefore direct investments enjoy labor cost benefits when made in this region 
(Intelligence Quarterly, 2012).  
 These factors take on a slightly new shade when the global financial crisis of 2008 is 
included in consideration as an external event. Although the impact on trade and growth was not 
homogenous, generally the crisis affected 2004 and 2007 accession countries badly. Those 
countries were more dependent on private external finances than other emerging market regions 
even before the crisis itself. In 2008, the crisis gained intensity and foreign investors started 
losing confidence and trust in this region. Consequently, "CESEE was hit hard, in many respects 
even harder than other emerging market regions such as Latin America.” (Gardo & Reiner, 
2010). Eastern EU remains far more dependent on private external finances than any other 
emerging market region, and capital account liberalization has been more extensive here than in 
many other emerging markets. Already before the financial crisis of 2008 itself, the latest EU 
members such as Romania and Bulgaria carried consistently the highest current account deficit. 
On the contrary Poland and Slovenia were constant with a current account deficits ranging 
between -1% to -5% of GDP. Those imbalances were triggered mainly by a heavy inflow of FDI 
(Fry, 1996). 
 Another factor contributing significantly to a fragile condition among East EU countries 
during the financial crisis was the varying exchange rate regimes. While Slovakia and Slovenia 
implemented the Euro currency in 2009 and 2007 respectively, the Baltic regions and Bulgaria 
adopted the one of the other forms of currency board system.  The remaining EE are on floating 
exchange rate systems.  This contributed to a breakdown of capacity to import, which in turn led 
to mystifying events such as the case of Latvia that became a net exporter of cars in 2009 
“without having any car production at all”. Consequently, the crash in domestic demand 
transformed into growing unemployment and Hungary, Latvia and Ukraine receiving emergency 
loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) ("Intelligence Quarterly," 2012). 
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Furthermore, the lower demand led to lower productivity in the former EU countries. These 
factors do not offer valuable reasons for domestic demand to be recovered soon again “unless 
there is significant return of both pre-crash drivers: FDI and cross-border lending" (Kattel, 2010). 
However, the financial crisis and the following Euro crisis scared investments from abroad and 
in 2008 the inflow of FDI in the EU halved and in 2009 dropped sharply especially in the new 
accession countries (Kattel, 2010; Gardo & Reiner, 2010). While some investors saw in the EU 
risks rather than potential, Chinese buyers treated the crisis in affected regions in the EU as a 
prospect of discounted prices. Apart from that, through the financial crisis Chinese investors also 
gained new confidence, as local economies tended to be rather welcoming toward incoming 
investments and business deals, especially East European Union countries, as the financial crisis 
hit them the hardest.   
 For the first hypothesis, I am looking mainly at West and Central EU countries, and for 
the second hypothesis, I collected data on Hungary, Romania, and Serbia. Serbia is not a member 
of the EU, yet it officially applied for its membership in 2009 and became an official candidate 
in 2011. Observing its attitude toward Chinese investment could, depending on the results, 
represent crucial findings regarding inconsistencies between Serbia’s EU membership and Sino-
Serbian relations. Also Serbia as an EU candidate contributes to Serbia’s economic integration 
with Europe. Serbia thus represents a link between China and the rest of the EU market. 
Additionally, in terms of economic implications, entering one EU economy gives an overall 
easier access to the rest of the EU market. Strategically, by targeting weaker and more vulnerable 
economies who are in need of either financial or political help, the prospects of achieving the 
economic and politic goals become more promising. Consequently, analysts assume that the 




 “Comparatively speaking, China has fewer political contradictions with central and East 
European countries (than with the West) and feels comfortable cooperating with them.” 
However, it is to be noted that “Europe is one market and one production site” too.15 As East EU 
countries were hit the hardest by the financial crisis, they play a big role in bridging China and 
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China Expects Serbia to be its “Friend in EU”, available at http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-
article.php?yyyy=2012&mm=03&dd=16&nav_id=79309 
15




other countries not a part of EU and also not in the European continent.
16
 If those countries show 
any behavioral pattern in terms of human rights and public opinion as a result of the inflow of 
Chinese OFDI, further claims and hypotheses about OFDI could be built.  
 
 
 11.1. Hungary 
 11.1.1. Background of Hungary-China relations 
 
 Recently, China's presence in Central and Eastern EU (CEEU) has gained intensity as 
Chinese economic power has grown confidently and the CEEU has shown an almost desperate 
need of this potentially profitable relationship that has been a result of the financial crisis. Yet, 
this topical partnership is not as recent as it may appear at first sight. For instance, Hungary's ties 
with China could be traced several decades back and they could be considered as generally 
successful. 
 Hungary officially recognized the People's Republic of China on 4th October 1949. 
Subsequently, several formal visits marked the beginning of their partnership. This contributed to 
a positive improvement in economic, political and cultural bonds. Despite the fact that the 
foreign politics of both actors were considered to be under Soviet Union's sphere of interest, 
Hungary showed disinterest toward Moscow's foreign policy. Instead, Hungary tended to follow 
its own principles regarding its international affairs with China which showed an overall positive 
attitude (Pal and Igor, 2002; Gregor, 1998) 
  However, the end of the 1950s was marked by profound ideological differences. The 
peak was reached in the mid of the 1960s after the cultural revolution in China. Subsequently, 
the tension became colder. It was the democratic transition in 1989 that again cut off a 
considerably high level of exchanges between the two countries. It was mainly Hungary's 
reorientation of its foreign policy that its interests were directed towards Euro-Atlantic politics. 
Consequently, there was almost no contact between China and Hungary for almost two decades 
(Nagy, 2009; Gregor, 1998) 





 A reattempt towards a partnership was initiated only in 2003 after the Hungarian Prime 
Minister Peter Medgyessy paid a visit to Beijing. After China's introduction of its "go global" 
plan, Hungary, regardless of its political orientation, started to initiate measures to develop its 
relationship with China. The results of this became obvious mainly in the sphere of investment 





  11.1.2. Current development 
 
 It is interesting to examine the plausible reasons behind China's choice of Hungary 
instead of other EU countries such as Czech Republic or Slovakia. Today Hungary has the 
largest Chinese population in Central East Europe. At China's side, further economic interest in 
Hungary rose after 2004, when Hungary joined the European Union. However, the investment 
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 While it is expected that Chinese investments in Hungary would start growing after 
Hungary joined the EU, the table shows rather negative results. It was the year 2008 when 
Hungary experienced a sharp decrease of Chinese OFDI, yet afterwards it started to grow 
exceptionally fast. Since the outbreak of the global crisis, the condition of the Hungary's 
economy and market have been rather sluggish and kept declining. Investors started leaving the 
country in masses, as weak economic growth and the growing debt burden contributed to an 
overall depressed economy. Additionally, Hungary's exports have been seriously affected, which 
intensified the economic crisis (EEAG, 2012; Egedy, 2012). 
 As mentioned above, the only potential guarantee as yet for recovery is OFDI and cross-
border lending. However, when the crisis broke out, Hungary was considered as one of the 
"new" accession countries. Because of the higher risks, investors left those countries as soon as 
their confidence in those regions dropped. After 2008, China started to seek potential partners in 
the EU, and did not conceal its interest in weak economies. As a result, the Hungarian 
government started to approach China on its own more actively and pointed towards its interest 
in intensifying extended cultural and economic cooperation (Szunomar, 2011; Egedy 2012). Yet, 
EU countries are also aware of the fact that there might be a certain level of competition between 
them over Chinese OFDI. Instead of simple multilateral dialogues between EU countries and 
China about potential investment opportunities, the countries choose individual independent 




  11.1.3. Controversy over the banned pro-Tibet demonstration 2011 
 
 Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Budapest in 2011 was part of a tour to "help" 
Europe with its investments. Meetings with Hungary's officials were bilateral and it was made 
clear that the purpose of Wen's visit was business and only China-Hungary related rather than 
China-EU related. During Wen Jiabao's visit, a dozen agreements were signed, which as Prime 
Minister Victor Orban said, would create thousands of jobs in the country (Hsiao and Czekaj, 
2011). The contracts were calculated to be worth $3.6 billion. They consisted of plans for joint 
investment in a Hungarian solar pane production facility and plans to develop Hungary's 
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neglected Szombathely airport into a major European cargo base. Furthermore, the Chinese 
telecommunications manufacturing giant, Huawei, plans to expand its distribution centre in the 
country and expects to employ 3,000 people and boost product exports (Hsiao and Czekaj, 
2011). This would be Huawei's second largest supply centre in the world. In the end, Premier 
Wen made an open promise to acquire an unspecified amount of Hungarian debt to help to 
strengthen the Hungarian Forint by 0.3 percent (Xiaokun, 2011). 
 Premier Wen mentioned in his speech before the China-Central and Eastern European 
countries’ Economic and Trade forum that China was looking at the region as a helpful and 
advantageous entry point into the rich economies of the Western Europe (Hsiao and Czekaj, 
2011). He noted that through joint partnerships, Chinese corporations can build a more efficient 
and cost saving business approach and help to integrate Chinese investors into the industrial 
system within the EU (Xiaokun, 2011; Hsiao and Czekaj, 2011). Yet, Hungary appears to be 
outstanding among its neighbors and is already called China’s hub in Central Europe (Gergely, 
2013). 
 Premier Wen's visit was accompanied by demonstrations of Tibet supporters.  However, 
they were banned by the governmental officials. According to the press, all Tibetans living in 
Hungary were requested to report to the Hungarian immigration office. It was made public that 
the Hungarian government had high hopes from that visit. They expected China to help Hungary 
through a higher inflow of FDI and through buying of the European debt (MTI, 2011). 
  However, peaceful protests by Tibet supporters under the Hungarian Falun Dafa 
Association and few human rights organizations were planned and announced in advance. Only a 
few days before the visit, the Falun Dafa association was informed that they were to withdraw 
their request to demonstrate, otherwise every future request would be denied or rejected. The 
president of Falun Dafa revealed that the ban was due to Chinese pressure (UNPO, 2011). 
 Furthermore, "all Tibetans living in Hungary were instructed to report to the immigration 
office in Budapest" (Barbion and Singh, 2011). The reason for this move could be considered as 
a strategy to keep the Tibetans away from the Hungarian parliament in Budapest during the visit 
(MTI, 2011). The immigration office was closed on Saturdays and was at a large distance from 
the parliament. According to the "the Tibet post", the reason behind the instructions was that 
"They were busy and could receive them for a control only that day" (Barbion and Singh, 2011). 
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 On the contrary, pro-Chinese activists carrying Chinese and Hungarian flags did not 
encounter any difficulties. As "the Tibet post" reported, "On Friday, Namgyal, a Tibetan man, 
carried a Tibetan flag near the parliament, but was halted by a group of pro-Chinese activists 
carrying Chinese and Hungarian flags. He was then instructed by two people in civilian dress, 
who declined to show any police ID when asked, to put away the flag and leave the area. A 
cameraman who was filming Namgyal's action was forced to turn off his equipment. The pro-
Chinese activists were allowed to continue their demonstration" (Barbion and Singh, 2011). 
 The controversy over the banned protest was an issue during a session of the Hungarian 
Parliament, with several MPs showing their support for Tibet by wearing Tibetan flag T-shirts. 
Prime Minister Viktor Orban defended the ban, saying, "This is a free country - we do not wish 
to prevent any demonstrations against foreign visits. However, demonstrators are expected to 
refrain from undermining government efforts which serve the nation's interests...Freedom of 
expression is okay, scandals or trouble-making are not" (Barbion and Singh, 2011). 
 This event was followed by several investigations initiated by Ombudsman Mate Szabo 
to clarify whether the Hungarian authorities had violated the rights of assembly and expression, 
and the ban on discrimination. 
 The president of Falun Dafa expressed that the ban on their demonstrations was not in 
accordance with the constitution, as the Hungarian constitution specifies only two causes for 
denying a request to demonstrate - jeopardizing the operations of the government or blocking 
traffic - and that neither of those causes applied in their case (Barbion and Singh, 2011). 
 Considering the time frame during which those events occurred, and how President 
Wen's visit was announced and publicized, the link between the country’s need for investments 
and the violation of the country's own principles could be established. Just before the visit itself, 
Premier Wen and Premier Orban signed several deals at the end of 2010 when Orban negotiated 
a Chinese buyout of the Hungarian biochemical giant, BorsodChem. It was purchased by China's 
Wanhua Industrial Group for $1.6 billion in February 2011. By the end of 2010, Hungary 
received $370.10 million worth of investments from China compared to $8.21 million in 2009 
(Sass and Kalotay, 2012). Additionally, it was announced that during the controversial visit in 





11.1.4. Hungarian Citizenship for Sale 
 
 It was news that the proposed legislation listed on the Hungarian parliament's website 
that a status of permanent residency and a Hungarian citizenship would be granted to foreign 
investors who buy at least 250,000 Euros of special government bonds (Reuters, 2012). 
According to the EU law, Hungarian passport holders are entitled to live and work in the EU 
(Nemzet, 2012). "The proposal ties gaining citizenship to buying bonds because it intends to aid 
state financing this way" (Reuters, 2012). This proposal appeared after Hungary asked the EU 
and the International Monetary Fund for financial help and did not receive a positive feedback, 
as analysts calculated only a 50% chance of success. Furthermore, this proposal was the result of 
a suggestion from the Chinese side, and was meant to target mainly Chinese investors. "The 
Chinese have repeatedly made it clear that we need to create incentives for investment in 
Hungary. If a person becomes a Hungarian citizen, they will have more opportunities to 
investments" (Chernyshev, 2012) stated one of the authors of the proposal, ruling party 
lawmaker Mihaly Babak. This initiative was met with strong mistrust and criticism. Members of 
the House of Commons of the United Kingdom called this proposal a "shocking abuse" of 
Hungary's EU membership. 
 Interestingly, this move is also not in accordance with Hungary's reputation as 
moderately nationalistic. Just shortly before this proposal was implemented, the enforced 
Constitution adopted by the conservative party "Fidesz" openly addressed the protection of the 
Hungarian nation and Christian values, which was very contrary to the policy of multiculturalism 
adopted by the EU  (The Economist, 2012). The proposal therefore was surprising and rather 
unexpected. It is clear that this attitude was the result of Hungary's plight that made the party 
more willing to compromise their values and principles.   
 China’s engagement of Hungary may be seen as an attempt to buy political support from 
critical Central European countries whose economies depend on increasing sources of OFDI. Yet 
China is not specifically acting toward this. In this case, it is Hungary that wants to attract 
Chinese investments and further financial support. It is the governmental officials who choose 
the procedure of attracting them. Yet the pressure of the crisis and new competition for China's 
support has triggered a new attitude that prioritizes independent needs over the principles of a 
democratic country and the EU (The Economist, 2012). 
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  11.2. Romania  
  11.2.1. Background of Romania-China Relations 
 
 From a historical perspective, the Sino-Romanian relationship could be considered as 
rather positive. In 1949, after King Michael's coup, the communist party took over Romania and 
changed its foreign policy and became a loyal partner of the USSR.  In the 1960s, a small change 
took place when a new communist leadership turned away from the USSR in order to search for 
new partnership. Because of the previous dispute between China and the Soviet Union in the 
early 1950s, Romania and China decided to form a bond. However, after the Romanian 
Revolution in 1989 the situation changed and Romania started to direct its foreign policy towards 
the USA and became rather passive towards their partner China (Pancea and Oehler-Şincai, 
2012; Shambaugh, Sandschneider & Hong, 2008). 
  After 1989, a majority of East European countries developed a certain level of 
skepticism toward China because of the belief that close links with China might favor 
communism in their own countries (Shambaugh, Sandschneider & Hong, 2008; Gregor, 1998). 
Furthermore, in 2008 many Chinese migrant workers in Romania faced insecurity because of the 
economic downturn. As a result, Chinese population decreased significantly owing to limited 
economic opportunities (Latham, 2013; European Commission, 2012). 
 
 
 11.2.2. Romanian Citizenship and EU Values for Sale  
 
 After 2008, the attitude of Romania towards China changed again. Recent years are 
marked by significant progress between the two countries, especially after several Chinese major 
companies decided to open their branches in Romania. Also, the Bank of China will be opening a 
branch in Romania. 
 The perspective becomes more interesting when the normative role of the EU is brought 
into the global context. The EU is an active promoter of its political values, ideas and norms 
even outside of the Union (Manners, 2002). Manners argues that the normative dimension is 
crucial for EU also because of EU’s endless struggle for a “European Identity” which was 
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aggravated with the difficulties of integrating various cultures that share a violent history. Shared 




However, EU values and foreign policy approaches may clash internally among members 
when confronted with major powers, in this regard China, who does not necessarily share EU's 
principles (Milosan and Wang, 2012). During Romanian's pursuit of EU membership, it tended 
to reject or ignore investment proposals from China. However, after 2008 the situation changed 
and Romania started to open its doors for Chinese investment to boost its development (Chiriac, 
2011). 
 Several countries in the EU started to offer citizenships in return for cash as a result of 
the global financial breakdown that made it difficult for the countries to free funds for 
investment. Romania experienced its sensitivity towards the financial crisis when the Czech CEZ 
called off a crucial agreement to build a 400 MW gas-fired power plant due to unstable economic 
forecasts. Subsequently, the citizenship offer is seen as an attempt to draw the attention of 
investors to their country (Lajmanovska, 2012). Because Romania and most of the East EU 
countries faced a significant lack of will on the side of major Western utility companies to invest, 
Romania and the Balkan gave China the opportunity to compete on the global scale. A 
citizenship offer is becoming a trend that is also followed by countries such as Bulgaria, Spain 
and Malta. Yet, Romania is considered to be "the forerunner" in offering citizenship in return for 
investments or property purchases.  
Romanian citizenship has undergone a series of changes that can be retraced. Before the 
crisis in 2008, Romanian citizenship could be obtained only if the "person has lived in the 
country legally for at least eight years, or has been married to a Romanian citizen for at least 5 
years" (Iordachi, 2010). Later, this condition was halved for "famous international persons or 
investors" (Iordachi, 2010). In 2008, the conditions changed and it was no longer an obligation to 
show any evidence of "living" in the country, yet the minimum investment amount required was 
5 million Euros. In 2009, the senate adopted a proposal to lower the number to 1 million Euros 
without any further conditions (Iordachi, 2010).  To understand the importance of this step, we 
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 Manners also refers to the “normative dimension” as to the “power of ideas” or to “ideological power”. This 
perspective includes an external impact of the term. In case of the EU, "normative power" grasps EU’s ideological 
influence.   
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can briefly analyze Bulgaria, which has adopted a similar measure. Under the Law on 
Foreigners, the candidate is required to invest at least 250,000 Euros in a Bulgarian firm or 
305,000 Euros in real estate. However, the candidate will gain a permanent residency status, not 
only citizenship, as it is in the case of Romania. The difference is that through a citizenship, the 
investor will gain the status of an EU citizen as well. That gives them equal status and rights of 
movement and travelling as any Romanian citizen would have. Since Romania is not a member 
of the Schengen area yet, the economic activity of Romanian citizens is still restricted to a 
certain extent. However, a full citizenship lifts several barriers which foreigners had up to now, 
and means they can be considered as "EU citizens" as well. Romania is the first country that is 
offering a full citizen status to foreigners, and this has raised several discussions among other EU 
members (Chiriac, 2012). 
  A level of uncertainty has been raised in recent dialogues whether this step is or is not in 
accordance with the EU law and how it could affect EU norms and values. Romania decided on 
this step without consulting the EU authorities. Yet, as mentioned above, more and more 
countries have followed this attitude.  
 
 
  11.2.3. Biggest China Town in South-East Europe 
 
 It is important to analyze under which conditions those decisions were made. In Romania 
the benevolence toward citizenship occurred after Romania and China decided on a project 
worth 250 million Euros in total. That is the biggest China Town in South-East Europe which 
officially opened its first section in the mid of 2011, and was led by 19 Chinese businessmen 
under the Niro Group. The area covers 40 hectares hosting 3,275 commercial areas and 1,380 
logistic warehouses, kindergartens, banks, casinos, restaurants, etc. The second section is 
currently in progress and aims to include a traditional Chinese-like environment and a 
metropolitan shopping centre (Popescu, 2011).  A link between the implementation of the 
citizenship policy and the China Town project could be established. The purpose of China Town 
was mainly to create an environment that would attract Chinese investors. However, to secure an 
even higher long-term investment inflow, Romania tried to find a way to keep incoming 
investors to Romania and how to maintain a long-term investment inflow. A citizenship that 
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represents an entrance ticket to the entire EU market is more than just attractive. It is important 
to consider that this policy was introduced after discussions and agreements with the Chinese 
government. While China gives an impression of a closed state, it agreed to open its borders to 
certain EU countries while being aware of the possibility that some of its citizens would give up 
their Chinese citizenship. Romania's willingness to trade its EU norms and political values in 
order to attract investments and China's willingness to trade its citizenship to satisfy its hunger 
for new markets that would welcome its investments are adding a new value to investments. The 
value is a political one.  
 However, during the first dialogues about building such a multicultural shopping-living 
complex, the Chinese minority was not as significant in Romania as for example the Albans. On 
the other hand, it is the biggest Chinese investment in Romania. The promotion of the Romanian 
citizenship could be seen as a result of China-Romania 2008 investment planning (Pancea and 
Oehler, 2012). As Romania's China Town was also meant to be a residency for local 
businessmen, workers and traders, it attracted new citizens to fill the town, and sustaining and 
growing it. Immediately after the opening of China Town, discussions regarding further 
investments began, such as a 2 billion Euro investment in Romania's energy sector. In this and 
further investment talks, China acted as the only partner of Romania (Nagy, 2010; Shambaugh, 
Sandschneider and Hong, 2008). 
 On the other hand, activists suspect a new bias in Romania's politics. They refer to an 
incident that might be mirrored in the future. On the 26th of May 2010, fire broke out at the Red 
Dragon Market Complex that is part of the China Town complex.  Several Chinese businessmen 
had their stored goods, authorization papers, official documents, money burnt down. Nearly two-
thousand stores, and about forty million Euros vanished. It was not the first time the Red Dragon 
caught fire. Minor events are not unusual in this part of the district. In April 2010, dozens of 
shops run by Chinese merchants had to be closed due to illegal transactions. Romanian media 
reported on firemen injured by furious Chinese merchants who were illegally undertaking their 
activities in the marketplace. One report mentioned that firemen were rescued by some twenty 
policemen. In the media, the firemen were portrayed as victims of both the Niro group and the 
illegal and criminal Chinese entrepreneurs. The actual victims were not considered yet. 




 In addition, it is well known that the Niro Group has a controversial background and 
status among Chinese migrants as well as the non-Chinese in Romania. They are often associated 
with criminal activities, mainly corruption. Its roots are unknown, yet there are speculations 
about the Communist secret service ancestry of its leadership. Again, there is no evidence of any 
discussion from the Romanian government side.  
 Consequently, in the latest CVM report published in January 2013, the European 
Commission expressed criticism with Romania for "failing to meet demands on protecting 
democracy and the rule of law" (The Economist, 2013). The report also accused the judicial 
system of undermining anti-corruption prosecutors, and warned that if the Romanian parliament 
keeps blocking the prosecution for corruption charges of high-profile politicians, and if 
Romanian citizens have to rely on bribes to deal with their daily problems, then the country’s full 
integration into the EU cannot be considered as complete (Trauner, 2009; Vachudova, 2009; 
Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008). 
 On the contrary, the history of Chinese migrants in Romania is rather inseparable from 
the history of corruption in Romania.  It is argued that it is Romania's corrupt system itself that 
contributes to a successful adjustment process for Chinese investments. Romania's government is 
rather passive toward this issue. It is showing sympathy toward China. During Romania's visit to 
China the Romanian Prime Minister Emil Boc highlighted that Romania was prepared to stand 
for Beijing's position in return for stronger political and economic ties. Considering the fact that 
Romania had been constantly pursuing Schengen membership, it should fully commit to core EU 
values and foreign policy goals; otherwise it could lead to double standards and outcomes which 
cannot be predicted.  As a result of these newly established partnerships, China has the capability 
to directly influence state policies in South East EU states and build and shape a favorable 








 11.3. Serbia 
 11.3.1. Background of China-Serbia Relations 
 
 China's focus shows a growing interest in bilateral exchange not only with economies 
that are part of the EU, but also with countries that in terms of their history and geography are 
part of EU's sphere of influence and are furthermore expected to become members of the Union 
within the next ten years. The case of Serbia serves as a relevant example. The China-Serbia 
partnership model bears a close resemblance to the one China developed with some African 
countries.   State-to-state soft loans and a constant improvement in diplomacy led to strong 
strategic gains in Africa for Beijing thanks to the access to natural resources, market and political 
support (Ferrer, 2013). 
 China-Serbia relations have followed a positive trend since 1949, when the then 
Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the legal precedent of today's Republic of Serbia, 
recognized PR China as an independent state. The friendly partnership was maintained even 
during the Balkan wars when Serbia was temporary isolated, as well as through NATO's military 
campaign against Serbia in 1999.  
 
 
 11.3.2. Current Development  
 
 China-Serbia relations were even strengthened after the breakout of the crisis, when 
diplomatic visits became more frequent. Both sides used this opportunity to elevate their 
relationship to the level of strategic partnership. This mutual elevation of ties was attained 
through the Joint Statement signed by Presidents Tadic and Hu in 2009. It was an expression of 
commitment towards each other's basic national goals such as Beijing's One China policy and 
opposition to Taiwan's independence.  China also defended the official Serbian stance on the 
separation of Kosovo from Serbia. Furthermore China expressed "understanding of Serbian 
effort to integrate into the European family" (Pavlicevic, 2011, EU Observer, 2013), which is in 
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accordance with the second strategic goal of the Serbian government.
21
  The agreement signed 
between China and Serbia included China's four point proposal that strengthens this strategic 
relationship: 
 
"Point 1: have more political exchanges, including high-level exchanges, inter-
governmental, inter-parliamentary and inter-party exchanges and cooperation.  
 
Point 2: enlarge economic and trade exchanges, especially in infrastructure, 
petrochemicals, energy and high-technology and mutual investment.  
 
Point 3: enhance human exchanges. Both sides should expand cooperation in 
culture, education, health, sports, science, technology and tourism, and 
encourage youth groups, non-governmental groups and local governments to 
carry out exchange activities.  
 
Point 4: strengthen multilateral cooperation. The two countries should 
maintain consultations in the United Nations and multilateral organizations, 
exchange views and coordinate positions on major international and regional 
issues and promote dialogue and exchanges between different civilizations in 
order to ensure world peace and common development" (Pavlicevic, 2011). 
 
 This strategic partnership represented a significant step. Its signature made Serbia China's 
so far only strategic partner in Southeast Europe.  This exchange has been immediately followed 
by an increase in business forums in China as well as Serbia. Subsequently, there has been an 
expansion in trade and a rise in the flow of Chinese state capital into Serbia. Infrastructure and 
energy sector projects such as the EUR 170 million bridge and the thermal power station 
Kostolac that was contracted to China Machinery & Equipment Import & Export Corporation 
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(CMEC) are examples of investments that resulted from the new partnership. The value of the 
latter project is set at USD 1.25 billion.
22
 
 The scope and quantity of trade and investments are rising continuously. China is the 
fifth biggest trading partner for Serbia. While the Global financial Crisis led to a decrease of 
Serbian exports to EU countries, exports to China doubled from 2008 to 2009.
23
  In 2010, the 
China Trade Centre announced that the biggest wholesale and commercial centre in South-
Eastern Europe was established in Belgrade. It was worth over EUR 30 million and represented 
China's largest Greenfield investment in Serbia. On top of this, in discussion is the construction 
of the biggest hydropower station in Serbia to secure Serbia's position as the energy leader in the 
region (Maja, 2013; Raballand and Andresy, 2007). 
 While these projects have increased the level of dependency on China, in addition, an 
institutional project has been created to promote growing economic interaction. For example, 
Belgrade Chamber of Commerce (BCC) established a new division named "China Corner" to 
facilitate the flow of communication and trade between Serbian and Chinese enterprises. To 
boost cultural and educational exchange, Serbia opened the first Confucius Institute in the region 
through which Serbian students can be awarded graduate and postgraduate scholarships for 
studies in China, and Chinese language is now taught at three high schools in Serbia (Maja, 
2013; Pavlicevic, 2011). 
 
 
 11.3.3. Controversy over the Nobel Peace Prize Ceremony 
 
 On the other hand, China's continuous economic and political support for Serbia's 
position regarding Kosovo's status already habituated Serbia to be vulnerable to pressure before 
the crisis itself, as Serbia did not have many partners to choose from. After 2008 and mainly 
after the establishment of the strategic partnership, there have been visible signs of China's 
growing ability to influence Serbian attitude in the international community and align its policies 
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with their own (Florio, 2011; Noel, 1998). China's stance, such as in human rights policies, is 
often viewed as the exact opposite to the EU's, thus resulting in a zero-sum game in decision 
making processes that involve the consideration of China's and EU's positions.  
Additionally, Serbia signed a state policy that "Serbia does not join any international 
initiative criticizing China in international forums, neither by voting nor by signing declarations 
nor attending events whose consequence would be a critique of China..." (Pavlicevic, 2011). An 
example that could be viewed as highly controversial was the decision the Serbian government 
made regarding boycotting the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize Award Ceremony, which was highly 
criticized by EU officials. This was a significant move Serbia made, while it is still in active 
negotiations to enter into the EU. Serbia's boycott of the Nobel Peace Prize Award Ceremony 
was therefore translated as a clear choice of priorities. However, Serbia also wants to be part of 
the EU, as it entered dialogues with Kosovo in June 2013 to try to follow EU's expectations on 
resolving its Serbia-Kosovo disputes. This is because since 2010, the EU has been emphasizing 
that talks could only be continued if Serbia "first normalizes day-to-day relations with Kosovo 
and no sooner than June next year."
24
 In 2012, in the Progress Report on Serbia was also noted 
that the negotiations for EU entry are conditional on "the key priority of taking steps towards a 
visible and sustainable improvement of relations with Kosovo ... so that both can continue on 
their respective paths towards the EU, while avoiding a situation whereby either can block the 
other in these efforts."
25
 Consequently, for the first time since 2008, Serbia's nationalist 
government restarted the dialogue with Kosovo's leaders in October 2012. This sudden change of 
attitude shows that Serbia has interest in joining the EU community, but its priorities are split 
into two opposite directions and decisions are based on individual events that either force Serbia 
to choose either EU's or China's stand. The Nobel Price Award ceremony shows that despite 
Serbia's interest in accessing the EU, it prioritizes China's values over EU values, but in moments 
when China is not interfering, it leans towards EU borders. As a result, Serbia shows new efforts 
to convince the EU one more time by opening up towards Kosovo talks (Florio, 2011; 
Pavlicevic, 2011, Noel, 1998). 
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 The double standards that Serbia is showing have been evident since 2008 when 
investments and bilateral trade started to increase. Then Serbia reportedly refused to join 
initiatives embraced by the EU to criticize regimes in Iran (13 times), Sudan (4 times), 
Zimbabwe (4 times), Myanmar (4 times) and North Korea (1 time), countries that are arguably 
Beijing's protégées in international forums, reflecting China's position and dramatically deviating 
from the EU's values and policies (Pavlicevic, 2011). 
 These evidences show that China's strategic partnership with Serbia could have strong 
implications for Sino-EU relations. This also directly relates to human-rights discourse, market 
economy status, and China's image in the EU, as Serbia shows evidence of vulnerability to 
political influence from Beijing. This is reasonable as China has been a provider of convenient 
financial support in times of crisis.  
 As a result, a new pattern of regional competition between China and the EU is occurring 
in Serbia. While the EU also offers lucrative infrastructure projects and financial support in form 
of EU funds, the attractiveness of China's capital is growing, which gives China the opportunity 
to join the competition. Adding a number of cultural initiatives to this, a plot is created that 
builds up a positive image of China. Therefore, the Sino-Serbian example illustrates how China 
might influence the development of politics in Southeast Europe. Furthermore, Serbia is 
expected to join the EU. By creating a relationship of dependency with countries expected to 
become EU members, Beijing is creating conditions for an environment that favors China within 




CHAPTER XII. Conclusion 
 
 I argue that ignoring the role of interstate political relations in Chinese OFDI is a crucial 
oversight in the literature on the determinants of Chinese OFDI. The findings of this paper 
suggest that Chinese OFDI has the potential to contribute to China’s soft power. Yet, it does not 
necessarily imply that China is using this tool intentionally, but the fact is that it could play a role 
within the discussion of China and its soft power.  
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 Considering the roles of political relations and diplomacy identifies an important 
determinant of Chinese OFDI. However, it also contributes to the previous studies of Chinese 
OFDI. As noted, contrary to conventional wisdom, in the case of EU during the financial crisis, 
Chinese OFDI targets countries with high political risk. The reason for this is that such regions 
tend to lack investors and China is treated as the savior. As a result, China's investments are 
better treated and protected there.  In sum, Chinese investors target the risk markets, not 
because of their risk acceptant preference, but rather "because of the risk-reduction effect of 
good political relations. When it comes to minimizing risk and maximizing returns, Chinese 
investors are no different from those from other home countries (Hanemann, 2012) 
 China's economic presence has been growing steadily for the past decade. Yet the actual 
springboard for the outflow was the outbreak of the financial crisis that caused the EU to be in a 
rather vulnerable position. In times when investment was desperately needed, especially in the 
East EU region, investors started to leave and avoid the EU market due to the lack of stability 
and security. This attitude was exacerbated by the onset of the Euro crisis. While China's role as 
an international power and driver of international economic growth before the crisis could not be 
denied, it was after 2008 when the significance of China's economic potential became not only 
visible but sought after.  This unprecedented situation is all the more surprising since it was not 
China that enforced its presence, but rather, particular EU members that expressed their interest 
for China's investments and started to build diplomatic and political relationships with China, to 
not only accept China's existing investment capital, but also to attract and secure further 
investors. Political actors started to develop incentives to link political and economic relations 
together to gain benefits from OFDI. However, the potential harmful effects have not been fully 
considered.  Opinion polls show a split. On one hand, the overall percentage of people who view 
China as rather favorable is below fifty (Meunier, 2012).  
Since the year 2008, however, public opinion started showing a small yet steady growth. 
This growth was accompanied by a high inflow of Chinese OFDI. This was due to several 
reasons. China provided the struggling economies with a flood of capital in the form of OFDI. 
While the number of secured jobs might have been small, it was not necessarily irrelevant. 
Another reason could be seen in the way China was portrayed in the media. Before the crisis, it 
was China's internal political domain, such as human rights and lack of democratic values that 
had been targeted by the media. After the crisis, China has been viewed as an active contributor 
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and participator in economic developments (Meunier, 2012). China appeared in the media as a 
strong economy, a savior of the EU's financial crisis. China was given new credit. China's 
economic strength and the EU's economic weakness put the rivals, China and EU, through a 
comparison in the public's eyes. The positive impression the public gained through China's 
economic success could be mirrored in the judgment of China's role as a member of the 
international community.   
However, the EU's uncoordinated response towards China caused incoherence between 
the EU as a unit and its member states. Because each EU member develops its own agenda for 
China, it increases the risk for Chinese investment to be political, discriminatory and 
unpredictable.  The banned pro-Tibetan protests in Hungary clearly show that a country could 
sacrifice its democratic or EU norms and values. This illustrates the moment when Chinese 
investments become political. Policies and diplomatic process are being adjusted to ease China's 
entrance to a country's market. Despite several controversies, such as the sudden implementation 
of citizenship offers, the EU is rather quiet. However, this heterogenic mood within the EU also 
shows that some EU members show clearly what their current priorities are, and in particular 
cases, a country prioritizes its interests in Chinese investment and diplomacy over EU values. 
Chinese investment may divide the interests of EU members, which could result in EU's split. 
 The political character of Chinese investments is visible in the vague lines between 
China's government and China's companies and investment in the EU. The China government is 
still the main decision maker even in issues that concern China's economic activities, whether 
they are private or not. The majority of China's investment activities in the EU is being 
communicated at the governmental level. Through this "China could directly influence state 
policies in the EU", which could led to a relation of dependency in certain countries. This again 
could have consequences for EU policymaking and EU as one unit (Poulain, 2011). Because 
Chinese investment show the potential of political influence that could be used by China to its 
own advantage, it is necessary to point out that soft power has its relevance. While the trend has 
led scholars to believe that it is the political factors that influence and shape economic factors 
with China's appearance on the EU market, the view has to be extended. Economic factors do 
have the ability to influence politics and change political preferences on the governmental level. 
In the case of Chinese investments in the EU market, we observe that states and governments 
adjust their preferences and political ideologies, such as in the case of Hungary, where the ruling 
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party with prevailing nationalism offers incoming Chinese investors citizenships to favor and 
attract China. They offer political compromises in order to receive economic and financial 
support. As a result, this may actively, yet not directly, contribute to the growth of China's soft 
power. 
 However, one must be careful with the usage of this argument. While Chinese investment 
in the EU might contribute to the rise of China's soft power in the EU, it does not mean that it is 
the direct intention of China to use its economic might to make weak states in the EU support 
China's political interests on the economic as well as on the human rights level. It cannot be 
argued that either the China government itself, or with the help of SOEs and OFDI, is targeting 
the EU in order to receive political support. The governments of these four case countries indeed 
seem to have changed their positions and policies to make the investment and trade procedure 
between their country and China's market more efficient and simple, in order to attract even more 
Chinese investment. Most of the governments decided to adjust their policies in order to 
accommodate more foreign investment. However this paper tries to prove that because of the 
political nature of Chinese investments, considering the role of the Chinese government as one of 
the main pushing forces, I argue that EU governments change not only their policies that are 
trade related, but also their way of communicating the occurrence of newly introduced policies 
on the EU market.  
The majority of studies discussed in this paper show that Chinese companies have the 
tendency to invest in countries that are affected by a high level of political risks (Buckley, et al., 
2007; Kolstad and Wiig, 2012). These findings contradict the findings in most cross-national 
studies of FDI flows (Henisz, 2000; Jensen, 2003; Li and Resnick, 2003). One of the reasons for 
this new pattern is that countries with a higher risk tend to maintain better relations with China. 
Consequently, those countries also provide favorable treatment and protection for Chinese 
investors in order to keep them, due to their lack of investors. Therefore, establishing the impact 








Glossary of terms 
 
OFDI or ODI – Outward Foreign Direct Investment or Outward Direct Investment. The 
definition of OFDI is based on the definition provided by the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD): "Outward direct investment is investment by a resident 
direct investor in a non-resident direct investment enterprise; the direction of the influence by the 
direct investor is “outward” for the reporting economy; also referred to as direct investment 
abroad”26. References to OFDI are measured on a yearly basis unless otherwise specified. 
 
FDI – Foreign Direct Investment. The definition of FDI is based on the definition provided by 
The World Bank: “Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a 
lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an 
economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, 
other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments.”27  
 
EU – European Union 
 
SOE – Chinese state-owned enterprises 
 
CIC - China Investment Corporation 
 
SWF - Sovereign Wealth Fund 
 
OECD - Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
 
EFSF - European Financial Stability Facility 
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